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Abstract 
People do not only feel guilt from not living up to others’ expectations (Battigalli and 
Dufwenberg (2007)), but may also like to exceed them. We propose a model that 
generalizes the guilt aversion model to capture the possibility of positive surprises 
when making gifts. A model extension allows decision makers to care about others’ 
attribution of intentions behind surprises. We test the model in a series of dictator 
game experiments. We find a strong causal effect of recipients’ expectations on 
dictators’ transfers. Moreover, in line with our model, the correlation between 
transfers and expectations can be both positive and negative, obscuring the effect in 
the aggregate. Finally, we provide evidence that dictators care about what recipients 
know about the intentions behind surprises.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Models of guilt aversion assume that people feel guilt from not living up to 
others’ expectations (Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007), henceforth "BD"). Yet, it 
appears plausible that some people do not only suffer from negative surprises, but 
may also get pleasure from positive surprises (e.g., Mellers et al. (1997)). We thus 
propose a generalized model of guilt aversion by incorporating the notion that people 
may care for both positive and negative surprises when making gifts.1 In case of 
dictator games, our model implies that the dictator may experience a utility loss from 
falling short of the recipient’s expected transfer, and a utility gain from exceeding it, 
both being a potential motivation to transfer money to the recipient. Moreover, our 
model predicts a positive correlation between transfers and expectations for dictators 
who want to avoid negative surprises, yet a negative correlation for dictators who 
have a relatively strong preference for creating positive surprises. The underlying 
rationale for the negative correlation is that there is more room to positively surprise a 
recipient with lower expectations; that is, the marginal utility gain from a positive 
surprise is increased by lowered expectation.  
We test the model’s predictions in a series of dictator game experiments and find 
strong support. Moreover, we show that our data reconcile seemingly conflicting 
evidence from previous studies on guilt aversion. 
Our Experiment 1 is designed to investigate the prediction that dictator transfers 
can both decrease and increase with the recipient’s expectation, depending on the 
weight put on positive and negative surprises, respectively. We find a strong causal 
effect of recipients’ expectations on individual dictator transfers. The effect is 
obscured on the aggregate level because, as suggested by our model, dictators differ 
in how they react to the recipients’ expectations.  
Our evidence sheds light on the controversy about whether others’ expectations 
directly affect social behavior or not. By eliciting subjects’ beliefs about the 
expectations of interaction partners (second-order beliefs, SOBs), several studies 
                                                          
1 Our research is part of the literature that is devoted to people’s concern about beliefs per se, 
independently of the material outcome (Geanakoplos et al. (1989), Bénabou and Tirole (2006), 
Andreoni and Bernheim (2009)). The framework of dynamic psychological games (Battigalli and 
Dufwenberg (2009)) incorporates many of these earlier approaches, including the notion that people 
suffer from guilt when they disappoint what they think are other players’ expectations. 
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detected a positive relation between beliefs and observed behavior. The first study 
along these lines was conducted by Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000). In an 
experimental “lost-wallet” game, a player could either take an amount of money or 
pass the decision to a second player who then had to decide on how to split a larger 
amount between the two. The authors find that the decisions of the second player 
were positively correlated with their beliefs about what the first players expected 
from them as a transfer. In a study by Charness and Dufwenberg (2006), subjects who 
held significantly higher beliefs about their transaction partner’s expectation were 
also more trustworthy. This is in line with several other experiments that have found 
positive correlations between subjects’ self-reported beliefs and observed decisions.2  
However, more recently, others have argued that correlations between self-
reported SOBs and choices may be confounded by the false consensus effect (Ross et 
al. (1977)): the SOB might be biased towards one’s own choice. If this is the case, 
observed correlations between actions and beliefs are no conclusive evidence for 
beliefs causally affecting behavior.  
To address concerns about consensus effects, Ellingsen et al. (2010, henceforth 
"EJTT") induced SOBs in an experimental dictator game by disclosing the first-order 
beliefs (FOBs) elicited from recipients to dictators. While it can be criticized that 
recipients did not know that their FOBs would be transmitted to dictators, and that 
this was known by the latter (see our discussion below), the design allowed to 
establish a direct causal influence of SOBs on giving. Yet, no correlation was found 
between induced SOBs and actual behavior. The authors thus concluded that the 
empirical support for guilt aversion might be limited and partly confounded by the 
false consensus effect.3  
                                                          
2 For experimental evidence on the impact of belief-dependent preferences in trust, dilemma and 
principal-agent games see also Guerra and Zizzo (2004), Falk and Kosfeld (2006), Reuben et al. 
(2009), Dufwenberg et al. (2011) and Charness and Dufwenberg (2011). Vanberg (2008) investigated 
potential reasons behind the positive effect of promises on trustworthy behavior found in Charness and 
Dufwenberg (2006) and concluded that preferences for promise-keeping rather than preferences for 
meeting expectations might be the predominant driver of the results. With respect to dictator and 
ultimatum games, the willingness of some subjects to exploit information asymmetries between 
themselves and recipients suggests that behavior depends on beliefs (see, for example, Mitzkewitz and 
Nagel (1993), Güth et al. (1996), Güth and Huck (1997), Dana et al. (2007), Andreoni and Bernheim 
(2009), Grossman (2010, 2014), Ockenfels and Werner (2012), Taubinsky (2012), and Cappelen et al. 
(2013)). 
3 See the references in EJTT and, for more recent, mixed laboratory evidence on guilt aversion, 
Bellemare et al. (2011, 2014), Attanasi et al. (2014), Kawagoe and Narita (2014). 
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Our Experiment 1 closely follows the EJTT experiment design. Indeed, we 
replicate all main results of EJTT’s dictator treatment, including the lack of 
correlation between transfers and induced SOBs on the between-subject level. 
Moreover, we provide further evidence for the confounding role of the false 
consensus effect. However, in addition to EJTT, we elicit transfers for many 
expectation levels of the recipient. This allows us to investigate the different 
individual patterns of behavior that we expect to see based on our model. The within-
subject data show that many subjects do systematically condition transfers on the 
recipients’ expectations, suggesting that both guilt aversion and a preference for 
creating positive surprises are relevant. Yet, because in line with our model we 
observe both positive and negative within-subject correlations of transfers with 
expectations, no such correlation can be identified for the aggregated data.  
In Experiment 2, we take a complementary approach to study the performance of 
our model in the laboratory. Here, unlike in Experiment 1, we are interested in 
creating a situation in which the comparative static prediction of our model is 
unambiguous in the sense that it does not depend on the weight put on negative and 
positive surprises in the dictator’s utility function. At the same time, we are interested 
to learn more about the nature of the dictator’s motivation for surprising. More 
specifically, BD introduced two models of guilt aversion. One is "simple guilt" and 
refers to a player who cares about the extent to which he lets another player down. 
The second model, "guilt from blame", assumes that a player cares about others’ 
inferences regarding the extent to which he is willing to let them down (i.e., 
inferences about his intentions). We formulate our model to capture the potential role 
of ‘intentional surprise’. The model predicts that if the recipient’s inference about the 
dictator’s intention is ambiguous, the latter has weaker incentives both to avoid guilt 
and to positively surprise the recipient, and should in turn transfer less. Importantly, 
this effect is predicted for both relatively guilt-averse and surprise-seeking dictators.4 
To test this prediction we introduce an experiment design, which manipulates the 
                                                          
4 With respect to the terminology concerning the dictators’ preferences, we note that both negative and 
positive deviations from expected transfers are surprising to the recipient, of course. Yet, dictators who 
are guilt-averse aim at reducing the element of negative surprise by living up to the recipient’s 
expectations. On the contrary, those dictators who positively deviate from the expectation aim at 
increasing surprise and are thus termed as “surprise seekers”. 
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recipient’s inference about the dictator’s intentions by making the recipient either 
aware or unaware about the fact that the dictator’s SOB was induced. The results of 
the experiment support our model’s prediction, and show that dictators care about the 
recipients’ attribution of their intentions behind surprises.  
EJTT’s experiment design and findings constitute a simple, well-known and 
influential challenge for guilt aversion in general, and for our model in particular. 
This is why we test our hypotheses in the same environment, utilizing the same 
method of controlling SOBs, as used in EJTT. However, we caution that some 
aspects of EJTT’s experiment design are controversial, because the way information 
is withheld from subjects might lead to a loss of control similar to deceiving subjects 
(although subjects are not literally deceived but surprised). In EJTT’s experiments, 
recipients are not aware about the fact that their beliefs will be transmitted so that 
dictators can condition transfers on them.5 Also, dictators might get suspicious when 
learning, before making their choices, that recipients were not informed about all 
strategically relevant aspects of the decision situation. This might create the 
impression that there are also possibly other aspects of the design that are withheld 
from the dictators. Overall, the procedures might lead to a general suspicion among 
participants that seemingly simple decisions may have unforeseen consequences, 
which eventually distorts the decisions made in the experiment. Thus, it is important 
to not only closely relate our findings to EJTT’s results (as we do in Experiments 1 
and 2), but to also conduct robustness checks which mitigate some of the potential 
problems inherent in EJTT’s design.  
Specifically, in our Experiments 3 and 4, all subjects have the same information 
about information flows at every stage of the experiment. At the same time, recipients 
explicitly decide whether or not to disclose their beliefs, while, using a novel design 
(described in Section 4), we make sure that these beliefs have not been strategically 
distorted. All central results from the first two studies can be replicated with our new 
experiment design.  
Section 2 presents our generalized model of surprising, describes the experimental 
design to investigate both guilt aversion and surprise seeking, analyzes the data and 
compares them to related results in the literature. Section 3 extends the model of 
                                                          
5 Recipients were debriefed about actual information flows after they submitted their beliefs. 
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surprising to capture the effect of the recipient’s inference about the dictator’s 
intention, and presents the design and the results of the second experiment. Section 4 
describes our robustness checks and Section 5 concludes. 
2. A MODEL OF SURPRISING OTHERS AND EXPERIMENT 1 
2.1. Model 
The dictator game is a useful starting point for our application of psychological 
game theory to demonstrate the impact of surprises (and intentions behind surprises) 
on social behavior, because it abstracts away from potentially confounding strategic 
or reciprocal interaction. Assume that dictator i divides an amount normalized to 1 
between himself and recipient j, who holds an ex ante expectation jE  about her 
payoff from the dictator’s transfer it . Applying the benchmark model of guilt 
aversion of BD, the utility of the dictator from transferring it  is  
 ( , ) (1 ) max 0, ( )i i j i i i j j iu t E m t E m t    , (1) 
where ( )im   is the standard utility of money, further assumed to have conventional 
properties (0) 0im  , ( ) 0im    and ( ) 0im   ,
6  max 0, ( )j j iE m t  is the dictator’s 
level of guilt from falling below the recipient’s expectation, and i  is a coefficient 
reflecting guilt sensitivity.  
In the formalization by BD, guilt is strictly positive only for transfers strictly 
below expectations. That is, only negative surprises matter. However, based on the 
idea that people like pleasant surprises, it appears reasonable that both negative and 
positive deviations from the recipient’s expectation directly enter the dictator’s utility 
function. More specifically, we assume that dictators do not only suffer from 
                                                          
6 The non-linearity of mi is needed to guarantee the existence of interior solutions for optimal transfers 
(see Lemma 2 in Appendix A). 
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negatively surprising the recipient, but also derive utility from positively surprising 
her.7  
Moreover, while some applied models of guilt aversion (e.g., Charness and 
Dufwenberg (2011) and Beck et al. (2013)) take the point expectation as the 
recipient’s reference point, other models of reference-dependent preferences exploit 
the whole distribution of beliefs (a reference lottery; e.g., Köszegi and Rabin (2006)). 
That is, the ex post outcome is compared with all outcomes in the support of the 
reference lottery weighted by the corresponding ex ante probabilities.8 Following this 
approach, we assume that the reference point of the recipient, against which the 
surprise is evaluated, is given by a probability distribution of possible outcomes (i.e., 
the reference point is stochastic). As we show in Appendix A, the distribution-wise 
representation of beliefs allows that the marginal surprise (and hence, the optimal 
transfer) continuously changes with expectations, without precluding discrete jumps.9  
We further denote the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of the FOB of the 
recipient as jH , with the corresponding probability density function (pdf) jh . The 
above assumptions lead to the following extension of the dictator’s utility function 
(1):  
( | ) (1 ) ( | ),i i j i i i i ju t h m t S t h    (2) 
with  
                                                          
7 A related psychological game approach is Ruffle (1999) who formulates a model in which positive 
surprising is only possible in mixed-strategy equilibria. His approach differs from ours in that our 
model mainly focuses on the analysis of optimal pure strategies, allowing for the possibility of non-
equilibrium beliefs. Geanakoplos et al. (1989), too, present an example of a psychological game where 
the recipient likes being positively surprised. 
8 The ex post outcome is perceived as a gain relative to lower possible outcomes, and as a loss relative 
to higher possible ones. Larsen et al. (2004), among others, provide psychological evidence that people 
experience different feelings of both pleasure and pain while simultaneously comparing the realized 
outcome with, respectively, lower and higher counterfactuals. 
9 An alternative approach to get the optimal transfer continuously change with beliefs would be to 
introduce some nonlinearity directly into the guilt function, which, however, would require additional 
assumptions on its functional form. Another possible way would be to keep a point-wise recipient’s 
expectation as her reference point, but to introduce some uncertainty for the dictator regarding it, 
which would imply that the SOB of the dictator is stochastic, as stated in our subsequent model. 
However, such approach would result in a deterministic dictator’s reference point if a moment of the 
recipient’s FOB distribution is exogenously signaled to the dictator, which is the focus of our 
laboratory analysis. 
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1
0
( | ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
i
i
t
i i j i i j i i j
t
S t h t x h x dx x t h x dx      . (3) 
Hereafter, iS  is referred to as the surprise function. The first term in the surprise 
function represents the dictator’s utility from positive surprises (when )ix t , while 
the second one represents the disutility from negative surprises (when )ix t . The 
stochastic reference point is the distribution of FOB, given by the pdf jh . 
Correspondingly, the scalar 0i   denotes the propensity to make positive surprises 
(surprise seeking), and the scalar 0i   corresponds to the propensity to avoid 
negative surprises (guilt aversion). These propensities are not necessarily equal. In 
order to simplify the exposition, we assume that the value of surprise for a particular 
belief x  and transfer it  (the term weighted by ( ))jh x  is linear in ix t .  
In what follows, we make the following assumptions on the utility function: 
A1. 0 0.i i     
A2. (1 )  
2
i i
i im t
 
    for any [0,1]it  . 
Assumption A1 rules out the trivial case when the dictator does not have any 
belief-dependent preferences.10 Assumption A2 states that the marginal monetary cost 
of giving is larger than the average sensitivity to positive and negative surprises. For 
example, if 0i   and 0i  , Assumption A2 requires that for a decrease in the 
negative surprise term by 1 Euro a dictator is willing to pay at most 2 Euro.11 The 
                                                          
10 When both coefficients are 0, the dictator chooses zero transfers for any beliefs. In principle, one 
could also add other motives, not related to beliefs, such as inequality aversion to the utility function 
(Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000)). Then, there can be positive equilibrium 
transfers even if 0i i   . Yet, the transfers will be independent of beliefs (which is the null 
hypothesis in the subsequent Experiment 1). Assumption A1 is also needed to ensure the strict 
comparative statics prediction of Proposition 2. 
11 In this case the decrease in the negative surprise term by 1 Euro yields an increase in the total utility 
equal to i  , and the payment of additional 2 Euro results in a loss of at least 0( )2im w  , where   
corresponds to 1 Euro in terms of normalized amounts and 0w  is the initial level of wealth. 
Assumption A2 implies that the loss is weakly higher than the gain. Technically, the assumption is 
needed to prove Proposition 2. 
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assumption is well in line with existing estimations of the quantitative effect of guilt 
aversion (Bellemare et al. (2011)).  
Regarding the information structure of the game, we assume that the FOB of the 
recipient is unknown to the dictator. Yet, he observes an informative signal j  about 
the FOB, which is equal to the median of the FOB distribution. Then, his SOB is 
characterized by the conditional cdf ( | ) [ ( ) | ]ij j i j jH x E H x   with the 
corresponding conditional pdf ( | )ij jh  .
12 We emphasize that we do not require that 
the recipient’s individual beliefs correspond to a rational expectations equilibrium (as 
it is assumed in BD). Rather, we treat j  as exogenous to the model. Mutual 
consistency of beliefs and behavior is rejected by numerous dictator game 
experiments, including EJTT (see their Figure 1, which reveals significant 
heterogeneity in beliefs about average dictator transfers). Of course, our modeling 
does neither exclude the possibility that beliefs are consistent with behavior, nor that 
average beliefs are consistent with average behavior (as roughly observed by Selten 
and Ockenfels (1998), among others).  
Further, we do not explicitly model how the dictator forms his SOB as the 
expectation of the recipient’s FOB conditional on the obtained signal. Instead, we 
implement a reduced-form model, assuming only that a higher signal leads to a higher 
SOB in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance (FOSD). 
A3. The SOB conditional on a higher signal (strictly) first-order stochastically 
dominates the SOB conditional on a lower signal: 
( | ) ( | )ij j ij jH x H x    if and only if j j    for any (0,1)x  and 
, [0,1]j j   .
13 
 
Finally, we impose some smoothness on the cdf function ijH : 
                                                          
12 The alternative assumption that 
j  is the mean of the FOB distribution would require a slight 
change of Assumption A2, keeping the underlying intuition behind this assumption unchanged. The 
original model of BD does not require a signaling parameter 
j , because here beliefs are assumed to 
be mutually consistent in equilibrium. 
13 ( | )ij jH x   does not depend on j  at 0x   and 1x   (being always equal to 0 and 1, respectively). 
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A4. ( | )ij jH x   is continuously differentiable on [0,1] [0,1] . 
We denote further the values of the surprise and the expected utility functions 
given transfer it  and signal j  as ( , )i i jS t   and ( , )i i jU t  , respectively. 
Let us now consider the optimal strategy of the dictator. For simplicity, we 
assume that the dictator plays a pure strategy conditional on the signal j , i.e., the 
dictator’s chosen transfer can be represented as a function *it  of the signal, so that 
*( ) argmax ( , ).
ii j t i i j
t U t   (4) 
Proposition 1 shows how the optimal transfer 
*( )i jt   depends on the dictator’s 
signal j  about the recipient’s FOB.
14 
Proposition 1. For relatively guilt-averse dictators (with i i  ) the optimal 
transfer is increasing in the signal j , while it is decreasing in j  for relatively 
surprise-seeking dictators (with i i  ). The increase (decrease) is strict if 
*0 ( ) 1i jt   .  
Proof. See Appendix A. ∎ 
Intuitively, this result stems from the fact that the reference point of the recipient is 
stochastic. Indeed, if the recipient’s expectations increase (i.e., j  gets larger), and 
the whole distribution of beliefs is shifted to the right, then it follows that a smaller 
part of the beliefs distribution is exceeded by a given transfer. Consequently, the 
marginal gain from positively surprising the recipient gets smaller since a smaller 
mass of beliefs is affected by the surprise (see (3)). This eventually leads to a lower 
                                                          
14 The proof of Proposition 1 does not require Assumption A2 and the fact that 
j  is the median of the 
recipient’s FOB distribution, but is consistent with them. In case i i   the surprise term converges 
to the representation with point-wise beliefs: |( )ji i j iS E t   . Then, the optimal transfer does not 
depend on 
j . The consistency of the interior solution condition 
*0 ( ) 1i jt    with both i i   and 
i i   is established by Lemma 2 in Appendix A. 
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transfer if the concern for positive surprises is relatively more important for the 
dictator ( )i i  . The opposite holds if the concern for negative surprises dominates.  
2.2. Experiment design and hypotheses 
Our Experiment 1 is designed to test whether heterogeneity in belief-dependent 
preferences (guilt aversion and surprise seeking) contributes to explaining dictator 
game behavior. As explained before, Experiment 1 closely follows the design of the 
dictator game experiment by EJTT, who informed dictators about recipients’ 
expectations before the transfer had to be chosen. The only exception is that we used 
the strategy method (Selten (1967)) in our experiment in order to elicit dictator 
transfers conditional on the recipient’s potential expectations, whereas EJTT 
employed the direct-response method. We choose this design because, as we show 
below, this allows us not only to replicate the EJTT findings (as a robustness check), 
but also to detect a potential heterogeneity in dictators’ transfers as a function of 
expectations, as suggested by our model, and so to provide a new interpretation of 
EJTT’s dictator game data.15 
In our experiment, each dictator had to divide 14 Euro between himself and a 
randomly matched anonymous recipient. Before observing the actual amount sent to 
her, the recipient was asked to provide a guess for the average transfer in the 
population. In order to stay close to EJTT’s design, the guess closest to the average 
transfer was rewarded with an additional bonus of 8 Euro.16 Before the guess of the 
recipient was revealed to the corresponding dictator, he was asked to indicate his 
transfer conditional on all possible guesses rounded to 50 cents. Guesses higher than 
9 Euro were grouped into a single category.17 This way, we collected 19 choices per 
                                                          
15 We use the term “strategy method” in a broad sense; dictators do not condition their decisions on 
other subjects’ actions – as it is typically the case with the strategy method – but on beliefs about 
expected transfers (see concluding section for a discussion of this method in our context). Attanasi et 
al. (2014) and Bellemare et al. (2014) applied similar methods in the context of dictator and trust 
games to detect behavioral patterns in line with guilt aversion. 
16 As in EJTT, recipients did not know (at the time of submission of the guess) that their beliefs will be 
transmitted to dictators, and dictators were aware of this fact. 
17 This was done to not bother subjects with reflecting on unlikely guesses. In fact, guesses higher than 
9 Euro were chosen by less than 5% of the recipients, and, likewise, transfers higher than 9 Euro were 
realized in less than 5% of cases. 
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experimental subject. After that, the conditional transfer, which corresponded to the 
actual expectation level of the matched recipient, was implemented and paid out.  
The experiment was conducted as a classroom experiment among students of 
economics and business at the University of Frankfurt with a total of 386 students. 
The classroom was divided in two separate halves by a central aisle. Students sitting 
in the first half received the dictator’s instructions, and students sitting in the second 
one received the recipient’s instructions. Instructions can be found in Appendix E. 
The recipient’s guess is assumed to be close to the median of her FOB 
distribution,18 and hence we also assume that it corresponds to signal j  in terms of 
our model. Then, the strategy method allows us to infer the mapping of signals j  to 
transfers 
*( )i jt   for each dictator. In other words, the design allows us to investigate a 
dictator’s willingness to give as a function of the recipient’s expectation. Our null 
hypothesis is that dictators do not have belief-dependent preferences, and hence 
transfers are independent of the recipients’ guesses. However, if the dictator cares 
about positive or negative surprises of the recipient, Proposition 1 suggests that we 
should observe transfers which are (positively or negatively) correlated with 
expectations (our alternative hypothesis).  
 
2.3. Experiment results 
In total we obtained 3,629 observations for conditional transfers from 191 
dictators (19 for each dictator), and 195 observations for recipients’ guesses.19 Our 
results are fully comparable to the results in the dictator game treatment of EJTT. The 
average actually realized transfer was 3.25 Euro. This was 23% of the endowment, 
which is approximately the same value as in EJTT, where it was 24% of the 
endowment. 28% of the dictators were not willing to transfer a strictly positive 
                                                          
18 In the actual distribution of transfers which we observed in our experiment, the mean (3.25 Euro) 
was close to the median (3 Euro). 
19 Because of a matching error, we had four recipients more than needed; these recipients were paid 
according to the decisions made by a randomly chosen dictator of another pair. A single dictator 
provided only one conditional transfer, while leaving the fields for other conditional transfers blank. 
These blank fields were interpreted as zeros, though, none of our results are affected if we drop this 
dictator. Also, we always include transfers conditional on the highest guess category (larger than 9 
Euro) in the data analyses, although our conclusions do not change if we exclude these values. 
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amount to their matched recipients. The corresponding value was 35% in EJTT. The 
average guess of recipients was 4.70 Euro. This was 34% of the endowment, 
compared to 32% in EJTT. Finally, EJTT emphasized that they did not find a 
correlation between guesses and transfers (Pearson correlation coefficient of −0.075, 
p = 0.497). In our experiment, the correlation between actually realized transfers and 
guesses, too, was not significantly different from zero (Pearson correlation coefficient 
of −0.017, p = 0.821).20 
All these observations are in line with our null hypothesis. However, the within-
subject data tell a more subtle story: 77.5% of the dictators changed their transfers in 
response to guesses at least once, and 53.9% of the dictators exhibited a within-
subject correlation of transfers with guesses which is significant at the 5% level.21 To 
check whether the observed patterns can be organized by a random process, we ran a 
Monte-Carlo simulation with 10,000 replications of random samples of transfers 
obtained by bootstrapping the original sample. On average, the share of significant 
within-subject correlations between transfers and guesses in random samples is just 
3.7% with a standard deviation of 1.3%. None of the replications produced a sample 
with a share of significant correlations of more than 9.4%. We conclude that our 
observed share of 53.9% is the result of a systematic choice. This rejects all purely 
outcome-based models as an explanation of positive transfers, and demonstrates that 
many dictators care about recipients’ beliefs.22  
                                                          
20 Random matching is itself a stochastic process, and hence a single random matching may be not 
representative. Our within-subject design allows a more robust measure of the average correlation at 
the between-subject level by estimating correlation coefficients under different possible matchings 
between dictators and recipients. We performed a Monte-Carlo simulation of 10,000 random matching 
combinations between subjects, estimating correlation between transfers and guesses in each 
replication. The average Pearson correlation coefficient is with 0.102 (p = 0.162) a bit higher than the 
low coefficient that corresponds to the random matching used to pay out our subjects, but it is still not 
significantly different from zero. 
21 While the dictators with a significant correlation showed a strong tendency to either increase or 
decrease transfers in response to guesses, 30.1% of them changed behavior at least once in both 
directions. If we exclude these dictators from the sample, none of our results are qualitatively affected, 
except for the difference in strength between positive and negative individual correlations which 
becomes larger (see footnote 23). 
22 These and all subsequent results remain robust to excluding guesses higher than 7 Euro.  
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Fig. 1. The distribution of coefficients, significant at 5% level,  
estimated in within-subject regressions of transfers on guesses. 
 
Consistent with Proposition 1, we also find that dictators differed qualitatively in 
how they responded to changes in recipients’ expectations. Figure 1 shows the 
distribution of the statistically significant coefficients from regressing transfers on 
guesses for each dictator. According to Proposition 1 positive regression coefficients 
correspond to relatively guilt-averse dictators, while negative coefficients to relatively 
surprise-seeking dictators. Figure 1 shows that 69.9% of the coefficients are 
distributed to the right of zero. The asymmetry is statistically significant: a two-sided 
sign test strongly rejects the hypothesis that the median is equal to 0 (p < 0.001). 
Moreover, the average size of positive coefficients (0.58) is somewhat larger than the 
size of negative coefficients (0.53), although the difference is not statistically 
significant.23 Overall, guilt aversion appears to be more prevalent than surprise 
seeking in our dictator game context. This seems consistent with reference-dependent 
preferences models (like Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Fehr and Schmidt (1999), 
                                                          
23 p = 0.123, two-sided MWU-test. The difference in size between the average negative and positive 
coefficients becomes statistically significant, though, if we exclude those dictators who changed their 
transfers with expectations in both directions. Then, the average size of (significant) positive 
coefficients is 0.60, while it is 0.46 for negative coefficients (p = 0.020, two-sided MWU test). The 
relative share of dictators with significantly positive coefficients then remains almost unchanged 
(69.4%).  
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Köszegi and Rabin (2006)) along with empirical evidence (like Tversky and 
Kahneman (1992), Ockenfels et al. (forthcoming)), which suggest that falling below 
the respective reference standard generally has a larger effect on utility than a same-
sized gain above the reference point.  
At the same time, we find that the positive surprise side cannot be neglected 
either. For one, similar to EJTT (see their Figure 1), we find that 27.2% of all 
transfers submitted by dictators were strictly above guesses. Second, and more 
importantly, 30.1% of the dictators for whom we found a significant within-subject 
correlation between transfers and guesses exhibited a negative correlation. This 
corresponds to 16.2% of the total population.24 This observation is inconsistent with 
pure guilt aversion, yet consistent with Proposition 1 of our generalized model. 
 
2.4. False consensus 
EJTT interpret the fact that there is no correlation between transfers and induced 
SOBs suggesting “that consensus effects are responsible for a substantial fraction of 
the correlation between second-order beliefs and behavior in other studies” (p. 101). 
In this view, the correlation between self-reported SOBs and behavior is not due to 
the SOBs causally affecting behavior, but rather due to a tendency of subjects to 
believe that others’ behavior is similar to one’s own behavior. However, our model 
suggests and our data show that EJTT’s non-correlation result is caused by opposing 
causal effects of SOBs across individual dictators – guilt aversion and positive 
surprise seeking.25 
At the same time, our data confirm EJTT’s conjecture and others’ findings that 
the false consensus is real. We measured the ex ante SOBs of dictators in a non-
                                                          
24 The highest share of dictators with a significantly negative within-subject correlation observed in 
10,000 bootstrapped replications of random transfers was 6.3% (with 95% of replications yielding a 
share below 3.7%). Hence, the share of negative correlations of 16.2% is outside any bootstrap 
confidence interval. 
25 One way to contrast the insignificant overall correlation with the significant within-subject 
correlation is to correlate guesses larger than zero with the absolute value of the difference between the 
transfer at those guesses and the transfer chosen for a guess equal to zero (i.e., with the absolute 
change in transfers). If transfers were just chosen randomly, we would expect a zero correlation 
between guesses and absolute changes in transfers. Yet, this correlation is highly significant with a 
coefficient of 0.217 (p = 0.004). Performing a Monte-Carlo simulation with different dictator-recipient 
matching combinations as a robustness check leads to an average correlation coefficient of 0.223 (p = 
0.003).  
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incentivized survey, which the dictators had to complete after the conditional transfer 
decisions have been made but before knowing the true guess of their recipient. The 
survey asked to provide an estimate of the average recipient’s guess. It turned out that 
the estimates were not significantly different from the actual recipient’s FOBs (p = 
0.315, two-sided MWU-test), with a mean of 4.30 Euro. However, according to the 
false consensus conjecture, these estimates are expected to be distorted towards the 
dictator’s own transfer choice as they were elicited without giving any information 
about the recipient. Indeed, the correlation between these ex ante self-reported SOBs 
and the corresponding conditional transfers is highly significant with a coefficient of 
0.438 (p < 0.001). That is, if transfers were chosen according to the ex ante SOB, 
expectations and transfers would have been strongly correlated. This is similar to the 
results of previous studies with incentivized SOB elicitation, in which positive 
correlations between beliefs and actions were found. We also observe that the 
absolute difference between transfers and SOBs is significantly smaller for the ex 
ante SOB (2.06 on average) compared to the induced SOB (3.20 on average; p < 
0.001, two-sided sign test).26 Overall, we conclude that the false consensus effect is 
real and may have contributed to the observed significant effect of SOBs in studies 
based on ex ante self-reported SOBs.  
3. A MODEL OF INTENTIONAL SURPRISE AND EXPERIMENT 2 
The goal of Experiment 1 was to establish that there is heterogeneity regarding 
how dictators respond to recipients’ expectations, as predicted. The goal of 
Experiment 2 is to show that, although there is heterogeneity in preferences, there are 
settings in which the incentives are perfectly aligned for all dictators, regardless of 
whether they care more about negative or positive surprises. At the same time, this 
section demonstrates that our model can easily be extended to also capture that 
dictators may care about the attribution of intentionality.  
 
                                                          
26 The result is robust to rematching of subjects, as confirmed by Monte-Carlo simulations. The fact 
that transfers are relatively close to self-reported SOB is neither predicted by, nor inconsistent with our 
model. However, the false consensus effect does not organize how dictators respond to induced SOBs, 
which is the focus of our model and experiments. 
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3.1. Model  
3.1.1. Basic idea and specification of utility 
We introduce a generalization to the utility function (2) of the dictator in order to 
capture the possibility that the dictator cares about the recipient’s attribution of 
intentions behind surprises. This corresponds to the intuition from BD who assume, 
in the analysis of their concept of "guilt from blame", that the recipient blames the 
first player more if the negative surprise has been intentional (that is, expected by the 
first player). We then explore the relationship between attribution of intentions and 
public versus private knowledge about beliefs. In particular, our approach elaborates 
on the intuition that public knowledge about expectations allows for a straightforward 
inference about the dictator’s intention behind a transfer whereas private information 
makes this inference difficult. As a result, the dictator’s motivation to surprise the 
recipient, and hence his transfer, is affected by the knowledge condition. The 
direction of this effect turns out to be independent of how much weight is put on 
negative and positive surprises, respectively. 
Our modified utility function takes the following form: 
1 2( | , ) (1 ) ( | ) ( | ),
S I
i i j jij i i i i j i i jiju t h h m t S t h S t h      (5) 
where  
1
0
( | ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
i
i
t
S
i i j i i j i i j
t
S t h t x h x dx x t h x dx      , 
(6) 
1
0
( | ) ( ) ( | ) ( ) ( | ) .
i
i
t
I
i i jij i i jij i i i jij i
t
S t h t x h x t dx x t h x t dx       (7) 
Here SiS  coincides with surprise function iS  considered in the previous section: it 
denotes utility derived from a simple surprise that the dictator experiences directly 
when deviating from the recipient’s expectation. In addition, IiS  denotes utility 
derived from the recipient’s attribution of the intentions behind the surprise, which 
we refer to below as "intentional surprise".  
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Technically, the only difference between IiS  and 
S
iS  is that in the former case the 
FOB density ( )jh   is replaced by the posterior third-order belief density ( | )jij ih t  
conditional on transfer it , with corresponding cdf ( | )jij iH t . The third-order belief 
( | )jij iH x t  represents the recipient’s inference about the actual SOB of the dictator 
conditional on observing transfer ,it  that is ( | ) [ ( ) | ]jij i j ij iH x t E H x t . Intuitively, 
I
iS  
thus corresponds to the recipient’s inference about whether a deviation from her 
expectation is by the dictator’s intention (as he could foresee the surprise), or due to 
the dictator’s SOB (erroneously) deviating from the recipient’s FOB. Analogous to 
BD’s concept of guilt from blame, we assume (through the functional form of (7)) 
that an intentional positive surprise leads to more gratitude from the recipient than a 
positive surprise that has occurred due to a dictator’s confusion about the true 
expectations of the recipient. Such additional gratitude then leads to a larger utility 
gain for the dictator from positively surprising the recipient. The same logic applies to 
negative surprises, where the dictator incurs a higher utility loss if the recipient can 
infer that her disappointment has been intentional. 
The coefficients 1 0   and 2 0   denote the relative weights of 
S
iS  and ,
I
iS  
respectively, in the dictator’s utility, such that their sum is normalized to 1:  
1 2 1.    (8) 
We assume 2  to be strictly positive because we want to investigate the impact of 
intentional surprise IiS . For the following results we also keep Assumptions A1-A4 
laid out in the last section. That is, we assume that the dictator gets a signal j  about 
the median of the recipient’s FOB, subject to Assumptions A3 and A4. 
 
3.1.2. Treatment variation and simple surprise 
We study two information conditions, which will correspond to our laboratory 
treatments in Experiment 2: PUBLIC and PRIVATE. In the PRIVATE treatment the 
recipient does not know for sure that the dictator observes j  before his decision. In 
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contrast, in the PUBLIC treatment the signaling of the recipient’s ex ante FOB is 
made common knowledge after the signal j  has been transmitted.
27 Importantly, the 
dictator knows the information provided to the recipient before he makes his choice.  
Since the treatment manipulation occurs after the signal j  is transmitted, the ex 
ante recipient’s FOB, signaled by j , is equivalent in both treatments. Consequently, 
the simple surprise SiS , which incorporates only the ex ante recipient’s FOB, does not 
vary between the treatments. That is, 
, ,( , ) ( , )
S S
i pub i j i pr i jS t S t  ,
 
(9) 
where the lower index pub stays for the PUBLIC treatment, and pr for the PRIVATE 
treatment. In contrast, the intentional surprise IiS  is based on the ex post third-order 
belief, and may thus depend on the treatment manipulation, which in turn, as we show 
below, leads to a smaller transfer in the PRIVATE treatment.  
 
3.1.3. Intentional surprise in the PUBLIC treatment  
In the PUBLIC treatment the transmission of the signal j  is common knowledge. 
Thus, the third-order belief of the recipient in the PUBLIC treatment is, by the law of 
iterated conditional expectations (see Duffie (1988), p. 84), equal to her FOB: 
, ( , | ) [ ( ) | ] ( , )jij pub j i j i j j j jH x t E E H x H x    .
 
(10) 
It follows from (6), (7) and (10) that the intentional surprise , ( , )
I
i pub i jS t   is equal to 
the simple surprise , ( , )
S
i pub i jS t  . That is, the recipient makes a correct inference about 
the intentions of the dictator: 
                                                          
27 As it is generally not possible to make sure that some information is common knowledge in the 
laboratory (because, e.g., somebody may have missed some information), we prefer the term public 
knowledge when we refer to experiment treatments, while we refer to the practically more demanding 
but theoretically simpler concept of common knowledge in our theory. In our analyses and in our 
experiment, the important aspect of the PUBLIC treatment is that a dictator knows that his recipient 
knows that he knows her first-order belief, which is what we explicitly told dictators in our laboratory 
if they participated in the PUBLIC treatment.  
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, ,( , ) ( , )
I S
i pub i j i pub i jS t S t  .
 
(11) 
3.1.4. Intentional surprise in the PRIVATE treatment 
Because the dictator’s SOB is not publicly known in the PRIVATE treatment, the 
recipient’s ex post third-order belief about the dictator’s SOB can be different from 
the actual dictator’s SOB. We model the formation of the third-order belief in the 
PRIVATE treatment as follows. Denote by 0 1   the ex ante probability assigned 
by the recipient that her guess j  will be transmitted to the dictator in the PRIVATE 
treatment. Then, given that in the case of belief transmission the recipient’s first-order 
belief becomes common knowledge (implying ( ) ( ) ( )jij ij jH x H x H x  ), her 
unconditional third-order belief in the PRIVATE treatment is 
0
, ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( ),jij pr j jijH x H x H x     (12) 
where 
0 ( )jijH   is the expected cdf of the dictator’s ex ante SOB (with pdf 
0 ( ))jijh  , 
which the dictator would have if he did not have any prior information about the 
recipient’s FOB.  
As before, we do not directly impose any consistency restrictions between the 
recipients’ and the dictators’ actual beliefs. However, we impose restrictions on the 
internal consistency of the system of beliefs of a given player. In particular, we 
assume that the dictator’s SOB, as expected by the recipient, is ex ante unbiased 
relative to the recipient’s FOB; that is, the recipient believes that the dictator does not 
systematically under- or overestimates her expectation: 
A5. 
0 ( ) ( ).jij jH x H x  
However, the recipient is uncertain about the actual dictator’s SOB distribution 
(which might be heterogeneous in the same way as recipients’ FOBs), and hence 
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0 ( )jijH   is represented by a probability weighting over possible dictator’s ex ante 
SOBs:28 
0 0
,( ) ( )jij ij
K
H x H x p  , (13) 
where K   is a parameter indexing the family of possible ex ante SOB 
distributions, and p  is the unconditional probability of 
0
,ijH   assigned by the 
recipient. Finally, we assume that the recipient believes that the ex ante SOB of the 
dictator is also internally consistent, i.e., represents a consistent assessment as in 
Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009). That is, the recipient believes that each possible ex 
ante SOB distribution 
0
, ( )ijH    should be unbiased relative to the distribution of 
transfers conditional on 
0
, ( )ijH   . This can be formulated as:  
A6. 
0 0
, ,( | ) ( )j ij ijH x H H x   for any [0,1]x . 
We also make two technical assumptions regarding the dictator’s expected SOB 
distributions: 
A7. 
0
, ( )ijh    is strictly positive and differentiable on [0,1]  for any  . 
A8. 
0
, ( )ijh    can be ordered by some indexing parameter   so that  
2
1
0
,
0
,
( )
0
( )
ij
ij
h xd
dx h x


 
 
 
 
 if and only if 2 1   for any [0,1]x . 
Assumption A8 is a strict monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP) and roughly 
implies that for any two possible SOB distributions one distribution can be said to 
reflect higher beliefs than the other.  
Since the recipient believes that the dictator’s SOB affects the distribution of 
transfers (by Assumption A6), the recipient can infer some information about the 
                                                          
28 The assumption of a discrete rather than a continuous family of distributions is made for simplicity 
of exposition and does not limit the generality of the results. 
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SOB from observing the transfer. Thus, the recipient’s third-order belief in the 
PRIVATE treatment becomes endogenous to the transfer.29 We employ here an 
additional technical assumption that if the realized transfer is equal to the expected 
median transfer, then the recipient infers that her ex ante belief is unbiased:  
A9. , ,( | ) ( , ).jij pr i j jij pr jH x t H x    
3.1.5. Results 
Our Proposition 2 is mainly based on the following Lemma 1, which implies that 
the recipient’s inference about the dictator’s SOB in the PRIVATE treatment is 
positively correlated with the observed transfer:  
Lemma 1. In the PRIVATE treatment the posterior third-order belief distribution 
, ( | )jij pr iH t  is strictly increasing in it  in the sense of FOSD. 
Proof. See Appendix B. ∎ 
Lemma 1 means that after observing a higher transfer, the recipient assigns less 
probability mass to low SOBs of the dictator. Intuitively, the recipient believes that in 
case of no belief transmission the equilibrium transfer should be consistent with the 
dictator’s SOB (in line with Assumption A6). Hence, after observing a relatively high 
transfer in the PRIVATE treatment, the recipient is more likely to attribute the 
transfer to the dictator’s higher SOB. Importantly, the positive relation between the 
recipient’s belief and the transfer holds for both relatively guilt-averse as well as 
relatively surprise-seeking dictators, and is in both cases driven by the assumption of 
the anticipated internal consistency of beliefs.  
Lemma 1 implies that there is less scope for attribution of intentions in the 
PRIVATE treatment: the recipient at least partly attributes the observed high (low) 
transfer to the dictator’s own high (low) SOB, rather than to the intention of the 
dictator to positively (negatively) surprise the recipient. Hence, the dictator’s 
incentives to positively surprise or to avoid guilt, which are based on the intentional 
                                                          
29 See Appendix B for the formal analysis. For simplicity, we consider the case with two possible ex 
ante SOB distributions 
0
, ( )ijH   .  
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part of the surprise function, are reduced, resulting in a generally lower transfer in the 
PRIVATE treatment:  
Proposition 2. If the optimal transfer in the PUBLIC treatment is interior, then it is 
strictly larger than that in the PRIVATE treatment.  
Proof. See Appendix B. ∎ 
Proposition 2 holds independently of to what extent dictators care for negative 
and positive surprises, and, in particular, of the sign of i i  . Also, here too, 
behavior cannot be confounded by dictator false consensus effects, because the 
dictator is informed of the recipient’s FOB in both treatments.30 Thus, introducing 
attribution of intentions into the analysis allows for a clear and robust testable 
prediction of the role of others’ expectations and intentions at the between-subject 
level, complementing the within-subject level analysis in Experiment 1.  
 
3.2. Experiment design, hypotheses and results 
3.2.1. Design and hypotheses 
Our second experiment was conducted with 254 participants in the Cologne 
Laboratory for Economic Research and the Frankfurt Laboratory of Experimental 
Economics. As in EJTT’s original experiment, our recipients were asked about their 
expectation regarding the average amount a dictator would send. Again, the recipient 
whose estimate was closest to the true average amount sent received an extra payment 
of 8 Euro. Each dictator was then informed about the expectation of the recipient 
matched to him before a decision on how to split 10 Euro is made. Participants were 
recruited with the help of the online recruitment system ORSEE (Greiner (2004)); the 
experiment program was developed with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher (2007)). 
In line with our model, we conducted two treatments with a between-subject 
design. In the PUBLIC treatment, recipients were told, after the expectation was 
elicited, that the matched dictator would get to know their estimate before choosing 
                                                          
30 However, because false consensus may matter for recipients’ inference in PRIVATE, we note that 
Proposition 2 would be robust to such false consensus as we show in Appendix C.  
24 
 
the transfer (i.e.,   was set to 1). In the PRIVATE treatment, recipients were not 
informed that their estimations were communicated to dictators (i.e.,   was set to 
0).31 The respective procedure was known to dictators. Instructions can be found in 
Appendix E.  
The design allows us to change the scope for the recipients’ inferences on dictator 
intentions, while at the same time minimizing strategic reporting of expectations and 
keeping recipients’ expectations fixed. Contrary to Experiment 1, where we elicited 
within-subject correlations between transfers and beliefs and thus used the strategy 
method, we conducted this experiment with the direct response method to focus on 
the treatment effect.  
Our null hypothesis is that dictators are indifferent to recipients’ inferences 
regarding the underlying intentions. Then, there should be no difference in transfers 
between the treatments. In contrast, Proposition 2 predicts that transfers are higher in 
the PUBLIC treatment. In fact, because our treatment variation exclusively and 
directly affects third-order beliefs of the recipient, and the dictator’s inference about 
these beliefs, a treatment effect would demonstrate the relevance of these higher-
order beliefs, which so far has not been established in the literature.  
3.2.2. Results 
The average amount sent in PUBLIC was with 1.68 Euro almost 70% higher than 
the 1.01 Euro observed in the PRIVATE treatment (p = 0.022, two-sided MWU-
test).32 This confirms the prediction of Proposition 2. Also, in line with the reduced 
incentive to take into account the expectation of the recipient in the PRIVATE 
treatment, we find that 71.7% (43 out of 60) of the dictators in PRIVATE transferred 
less than the recipient’s expectation compared to 50.7% of the dictators in PUBLIC 
(34 out of 67; p = 0.016, two-sided χ2-test). Similarly, and importantly for our model 
of surprising gifts, the share of dictators who exceeded the recipient’s expectation is 
                                                          
31 If some recipients suspected that their beliefs could be transmitted (so that 0 1),   the prediction 
of Proposition 2 is still valid. 
32 When we compute transfers as a percentage of the total amount to be divided (the cake size differed 
across the experiments), we find that the average amounts sent were higher in Experiment 1 than in 
Experiment 2 (23.2% versus 13.6%; p < 0.001, two-sided MWU-test). Part of the reason might be the 
larger social distance between dictators and recipients in the laboratory in Experiment 2, compared to 
the classroom Experiment 1. 
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more than twice as high in the PUBLIC than in the PRIVATE treatment: 28.4% 
versus 11.7% (p = 0.020, two-sided χ2-test).  
Due to the heterogeneity of preferences, we should – similar to Experiment 1 and 
the related studies on guilt aversion – observe only little correlation between 
recipients’ beliefs and transfers in the aggregate in both treatments. Indeed, this is 
what we find: Pearson correlation coefficients are 0.149 (p = 0.230) in the PUBLIC 
treatment and 0.020 (p = 0.881) in the PRIVATE treatment. All results are 
corroborated by Tobit models with the amount sent by the dictator as the dependent 
variable and including a number of demographic variables of the subjects (see Table 
F.1 in Appendix F).  
We conclude that dictators do not only respond to recipients’ expectations in ways 
that are consistent with our model, but also care about what recipients know about 
intentions behind surprises.  
 
4. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
Our experiment designs, following EJTT’s original design, might be seen as 
controversial because strategically relevant information is withheld from recipients. 
Also, the design introduces information asymmetries among participants, as dictators 
know more about the relevant decision situation than recipients. Thus, as a robustness 
check, we conducted two further experiments (Experiments 3 and 4), which partly 
mitigate the problems associated with EJTT’s original design. Specifically, dictators 
in the new experiments have no private knowledge about the strategically relevant 
aspects of the game at any experiment stage. However, we caution that our new 
experiments still omit strategically relevant information. The experiments had two 
phases, which was commonly known. Recipients submitted their guesses in the first 
phase of the experiment, yet were not told at that time that they will have the option 
to transmit these beliefs in the second phase of the experiment (otherwise they might 
have had an incentive to strategically inflate guesses). We acknowledge that this 
design feature could still be considered problematic, because subjects in future 
experiments might be concerned about such unanticipated relevance of judgments 
about others’ behavior ‒ although the option to not transmit one’s guess provides 
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recipients with full control over transmission of their beliefs and thus a form of 
insurance.33 
Both additional experiments were conducted in the Cologne Laboratory for 
Economic Research with altogether 306 participants (180 participants in Experiment 
3, 126 participants in Experiment 4). Participants were recruited with the online 
recruitment system ORSEE (Greiner (2004)). The experiment software was 
programmed with z-Tree (Fischbacher (2007)). The following subsections describe 
the experiment procedures and results in detail. 
 
4.1. Experiment 3: Between-subjects heterogeneity 
4.1.1. Design and hypotheses 
The main difference between Experiment 3 and Experiment 1 is that we now split 
the decision situation into two parts. In the first part, two participants were randomly 
matched and played a simple dictator game in which 14 Euro had to be allocated 
between the dictator and the recipient. Prior to the dictator decision, we elicited the 
guess of each recipient about the average dictator transfer, using the same procedures 
as in Experiment 1. Importantly, a dictator in Part 1 never observed the guess of his 
matched recipient, and the recipient received feedback about the transfer of this 
dictator only at the end of the experiment. Also, subjects did not receive instructions 
for Part 2 of the experiment until Part 1 has been finished; they were only notified 
that an additional part with new instructions will follow.  
In Part 2 of the experiment, dictators and recipients were randomly rematched, 
ensuring that no one would interact with a participant from Part 1. Contrary to 
Experiment 1, in which the dictator automatically received the information about the 
recipient’s guess, recipients now had to choose at the beginning of Part 2 whether or 
not to transmit their Part 1-guesses to their Part 2-dictators. If the recipient chose not 
to transmit, the dictator was informed about this and then had to state an 
unconditional transfer (from 0 to 14 Euro). However, if the recipient agreed to 
transmit her guess, the decision of the dictator was elicited in the same way as in 
                                                          
33 As we will see in the next subsections, only a negligible share of recipients opted against the 
transmission of beliefs in Experiments 3 and 4. 
27 
 
Experiment 1. That is, the dictator had to state transfers conditional on all possible 
guesses of the recipient (rounded to values of 50 Euro cents), with guesses higher 
than 9 Euro being combined in a single category.34 Hence, as before, we collected 19 
decisions for these dictators. The dictator was informed about the actual guess of the 
recipient at the end of the experiment. The transfer that corresponded to the actual 
rounded guess of the matched recipient was then relevant for the final payoffs. 
Importantly, both recipients and dictators received complete information about all 
procedures at the start of Part 2, including the fact that dictators would state their 
transfers conditional on guesses. At the end of Experiment 3, participants were 
informed about the results of the two parts and whether or not they received the bonus 
for their guess. One of the two parts was then randomly chosen for payoffs.35 
Our hypothesis is, based on Proposition 1, that our findings from Experiment 1 
can be replicated with our novel design. In particular, we predict that transfers are 
(positively or negatively) correlated with recipients’ expectations.  
4.1.2. Results 
The large majority of recipients (88 out of our 90 subjects or 97.8%) agreed to 
transmit their guesses to the dictators in Experiment 3. As a result, we collected 
conditional transfers for 88 dictators, yielding 1,672 observations.  
Despite the differences in the design of Experiments 1 and 3, subjects behaved in 
a remarkably similar way. Here we report the most important results; see Table F.2 in 
Appendix F for a table reporting all data comparisons. On average, in the relevant 
Part 2 of Experiment 3, dictators transferred 2.24 Euro conditioned on the true FOB 
                                                          
34 Because the recipient can choose whether or not to transmit the belief before the dictator decides 
about the transfer, the game is dynamic and the decision to transmit or not might involve selection and 
signaling effects (Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009)). Our model is static and thus cannot speak to this 
issue. However, if no or only a negligible number of subjects decides to not allow belief transmission, 
our model describes the subgame following the recipient’s choice accurately. Thus, we paid recipients 
who gave the permission to transmit their guess in Part 2 an additional 2.50 Euro. (Dictators were paid 
an additional 2.50 Euro in any case, making sure that the additional payment does not introduce 
another asymmetry between dictators and guess-transmitting recipients.) As the vast majority of 
recipients agreed to the transmission of guesses (see below), we can neglect the dynamic play in our 
data analyses. 
35 In Experiment 3, we additionally elicited the dictators’ guesses about the recipients’ guesses in Part 
1, providing the same incentives as for recipients’ guesses. Also, the bonus for the best guesses was 
paid out irrespective of which part was chosen in order to balance expected payoffs from guesses 
across parts. See the Instructions for Experiment 3 in Appendix E. 
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of their matched recipient. As in Experiment 1, we do not observe a significant 
correlation between realized transfers and matched beliefs, with the Pearson 
correlation coefficient again close to zero (0.054, p = 0.619). Also, we find very 
similar shares of dictators across the experiments who varied their transfer in 
response to guesses at least once (71.6% in Experiment 3 and 77.5% in Experiment 1) 
and who exhibited a significant within-subject correlation of transfers and guesses 
(58.0% in Experiment 3 and 53.9% in Experiment 1). The share of subjects with a 
positive correlation (relatively guilt-averse) among all dictators accounts for 43.2% 
(37.7% in Experiment 1), whereas the share of surprise-seeking dictators with a 
negative within-subject correlation is 14.8% (16.2% in Experiment 1). Similarly, the 
share of transfers that strictly exceeded guesses accounts for 23.9% in Experiment 3 
(27.2% in Experiment 1).  
There is a difference in the average sizes of positive and negative regression 
coefficients across experiments suggesting that the strength of these relations is 
somewhat smaller in Experiment 3: positive coefficients are on average 0.36 (0.58 in 
Experiment 1) and negative coefficients are on average 0.29 (0.53 in Experiment 1). 
Yet, despite the somewhat weaker effect of the relation between transfers and 
guesses, dictators in Experiment 3 tended to behave in a more consistent manner than 
in Experiment 1: only 15.7% of the dictators with significant within-subject 
correlation changed transfers in response to increasing beliefs in a non-monotonic 
way, whereas the corresponding share in Experiment 1 is 30.1%.  
Overall, the results of Experiments 3 and 1 are highly consistent with each other. 
Therefore, Experiment 3 strongly confirms the importance of considering between-
subjects heterogeneity in response to recipients’ expectations in order to detect the 
relevance of guilt aversion and surprise seeking for dictator decisions ‒ and it does so 
in a novel experiment design that mitigates the problems associated with EJTT’s 
approach. 
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4.2. Experiment 4: Intentions behind surprises 
4.2.1. Design and hypotheses 
Experiment 4 serves as a robustness check for Experiment 2 and had two parts, 
too. The first part was identical to Part 1 of Experiment 3, again with the purpose to 
elicit unconfounded recipient guesses about average dictator transfers. Also like in 
Experiment 3, in Part 2 dictators received an endowment of 14 Euro that they could 
allocate between themselves and the newly matched recipients, and recipients had to 
decide whether or not to allow the transmission of guesses elicited in Part 1 to the 
newly matched dictators.36 The main new feature of Experiment 4 is that even when 
the recipient agreed to the transmission of her Part 1-guess in Part 2, the Part 2-
dictator was informed about the guess only with a probability of 50%; otherwise the 
guess was not transmitted. This created an ex ante uncertainty to the recipient about 
whether or not the dictator would actually see her guess.37  
If both recipient and nature had transmitted the guess, we varied the recipient’s ex 
post knowledge about the dictator’s SOB (akin in Experiment 2). In the PUBLIC 
treatment, the recipient would get to know at the end of the experiment if the dictator 
had seen her FOB prior to his decision. On the other hand, in the PRIVATE 
treatment, the recipient would stay ignorant about whether or not her belief had 
actually been transmitted. Each dictator could provide two conditional transfers, 
depending on the payoff relevant treatment variation (PUBLIC or PRIVATE), which 
was determined by a fair chance move. This way, we were able to investigate within-
subject treatment effects.38 As in Experiment 3, dictators and recipients were 
                                                          
36 As before, if recipients opted for the transmission, they would receive an additional payment of 2.50 
Euro irrespective of dictator decisions. Dictators were paid the 2.50 Euro in any case. 
37 Subjects were told that they are playing in two "rounds" in Part 2, each round with a different 
opponent, and that the probability of belief transmission is 50% in each round. The 50% probability 
was implemented in a way that the guess of a matched recipient was transmitted to the dictator in one 
of the two rounds (conditional on the corresponding recipient’s agreement to transmit beliefs, which 
was elicited only once and applied to both dictators she would be matched with). No feedback was 
provided between the rounds. See the Instructions in Appendix E for the details. 
38 Thus, our Experiment 4 provides an additional check of the robustness of the treatment effect 
observed in Experiment 2 with a direct response method. The potential effect of the strategy method on 
transfers is ex ante hard to predict, though. On the one hand, the strategy method increases the saliency 
of the experimental variation and therefore might emphasize differences between treatments. On the 
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informed about all aspects of the decision situation before Part 2 started, and feedback 
about transfers in both parts and about actual belief transmission in Part 2 was given 
to the recipient only at the end of the experiment. See the Instructions in Appendix E 
for procedural details and Appendix D for an illustration of the sequence of actions.  
Our central hypothesis, based on Proposition 2, is the same as in Experiment 2: 
Transfers in the PUBLIC treatment should be higher than transfers in the PRIVATE 
treatment for dictators who care about beliefs, as both guilt-averse and surprise-
seeking subjects have less incentive to transfer their endowment to the recipient if 
dictators’ SOBs remain private knowledge. Moreover, we predict that the effect tends 
to be smaller than what is suggested by Experiment 2. The reason is that the treatment 
effect is decreasing in recipient’s ex ante probability   of belief transmission in the 
PRIVATE treatment, which is at its minimum of 0 in Experiment 2 and 50% in 
Experiment 4. The underlying mechanism is that the recipient’s attribution of the 
transfer to the dictator’s true intention becomes stronger with larger  .39 
4.2.2. Results 
Similar to Experiment 3, we do not have to deal with selection effects, as all 
recipients (63 out of 63) agreed to transmit their beliefs to the dictators. Our main 
hypothesis is corroborated by the data: On average, dictators sent 3.05 Euro (21.8% 
of the endowment) to the recipient in the PUBLIC treatment and 2.63 Euro (18.8% of 
the endowment) in the PRIVATE treatment, and this difference is significant (p < 
0.001, two sided Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks test). 54.0% of the dictators 
did not respond at all to the information condition, which would be consistent with 
2  being close to zero. Among those dictators who did respond, 86.2% transferred a 
higher amount in PUBLIC than in PRIVATE. 
Regarding the size of the effect, we observe that while the treatment effect is 
highly significant, it is relatively small: in the full sample, subjects transferred on 
average 16% more in the PUBLIC treatment, compared to the 70% increase between 
                                                                                                                                                                     
other hand, subjects may prefer to behave in a "consistent" way, not exploiting asymmetric information 
when it comes to social behavior. See also the discussion in our concluding section. 
39 See (B.6) in Appendix B; the dictator is less able to manipulate the recipient’s inference about his 
SOB by changing his transfer if   is larger. 
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the treatments in Experiment 2. This is consistent with our prediction, although we 
caution that the data are only suggestive here, as some design parameters are changed 
beyond  .  
Similar to what we see in all other experiments, in Experiment 4, too, the role of 
FOBs is limited in the aggregate. There is a small, insignificantly positive correlation 
between recipients’ expectations and transfers in PUBLIC that is similar in size as in 
Experiment 2 (the Pearson correlation coefficient is 0.211, p = 0.097), and there is no 
correlation in PRIVATE (the Pearson correlation coefficient is 0.043, p = 0.739). 
Table F.3 in Appendix F shows Tobit models that support all conclusions.  
To sum up, our robustness checks in Experiments 3 and 4 replicate all important 
patterns from our Experiments 1 and 2; the data show remarkably robust regularities 
in line with our central hypotheses from Propositions 1 and 2.  
 
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
We propose a model of ‘surprising gifts’ to investigate the role of others’ 
expectations for giving in dictator games. The model assumes that people care not 
only about negative but also about positive surprises induced by their actions. We 
find strong evidence for our model in a series of experiments, employing more than 
900 participants. While, similar to EJTT, we do not find a correlation between 
induced SOBs and actual transfers on a between-subject level, a within-subject level 
analysis in the first experiment shows that a large fraction of dictators reacts to 
recipients’ expectations. In particular, many dictators behave consistently with BD’s 
notion of guilt aversion. Yet, there is also a significant share of dictators behaving 
consistently with a preference for exceeding others’ expectations. The heterogeneity 
of belief-dependent preferences among subjects explains the lack of correlation 
between SOBs and transfers in the aggregate.  
We then extend our model to integrate the notion that dictators may care for the 
recipients’ inferences about the intention behind a transfer. The model predicts 
smaller transfers for both relatively guilt-averse and relatively surprise-seeking 
dictators if the inference about the dictator’s intentions becomes ambiguous. Our data 
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from the second experiment confirm the prediction and, additionally, show that 
transfers are at least partly driven by an attribution effect.  
We also extend EJTT’s clever but controversial design in Experiments 3 and 4 in 
order to test whether our (and EJTT’s) results replicate if the asymmetry of 
strategically relevant information between dictators and recipients is avoided and 
recipients have the possibility to veto the belief transmission. We find that all main 
conclusions remain valid. We caution, however, that our design still involves 
omission of strategically relevant information in one phase of the experiment. Future 
research might propose experiment methods to elicit beliefs in an unbiased way 
avoiding such omissions.  
One might hypothesize that some of our experimental findings are affected by the 
strategy method: subjects may consider it ‘appropriate’ to take others’ expectations 
into account, just because they are given an explicit choice to condition their 
decisions on expectations. While there generally appears to be no obvious a priori 
reason to favor one or the other method (Brandts and Charness (2011)), it does not 
seem implausible that the elicitation method can matter. We doubt, however, that the 
elicitation method is critical for our main conclusions. For one, we have shown that 
our strategy method results are, to the extent comparable, fully consistent with 
EJTT’s dictator game results, where the direct-response method is employed. 
Moreover, our data from our Experiment 2 provide complementary evidence for our 
model with the direct-response approach, and the data are fully consistent with our 
data from the analogous strategy-method Experiment 4 (see Brandts and Charness 
(2011) and Fischbacher et al. (2012) for similar findings in other contexts).  
Overall, our data are consistent with the hypothesis that guilt aversion is a major 
motivation for giving in dictator games. At the same time, our analysis highlights that 
many subjects also like to exceed others’ expectations, and that taking this motive 
into account, along with a motivation that subjects care about the attribution of their 
intentions, may improve the predictive value of the model. A natural next step would 
be to investigate how our results generalize to other social contexts. For example, 
related papers have applied guilt aversion to hidden action problems in principal-
agent relationships (e.g., Charness and Dufwenberg (2006)), and to strategic 
communication (Beck et al. (2013)).  
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It seems also worthwhile to investigate how a concern to please the opponent 
interacts with preferences to adhere to general norms of social behavior (Bernheim 
(1994), Sliwka (2007)). In our experimental context one might argue, for instance, 
that the recipient’s belief, if transmitted to the dictator, may be a valuable signal of 
what is the generally acceptable transfer. If dictators are also driven by a preference 
to conform to such a generally accepted social norm – as opposed to a desire to please 
one’s own, particular recipient – dictators have even more reason to condition their 
social behavior on beliefs. We note, however, that a norm-based explanation alone is 
difficult to reconcile with the negative correlation of induced SOBs and transfers that 
we observe for many dictators in Experiment 1. More generally, for the explanations 
based on social norms to go through, all that should matter is the knowledge about the 
recipient’s expectation, while our experiments show that, keeping expectations 
constant, dictators care about the recipient’s attribution of their intentions to surprise, 
too. Clearly, belief-dependent preferences matter for gift-giving.  
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APPENDIX A. Omitted proofs: Experiment 1. 
Lemma 2. For any i  and i  there exists a concave monetary function im , 
satisfying assumption A2, and [0,1]j  , such that for any ˆ argmax ( , )it i jt U t   it 
holds ˆ0 1t  . 
Proof. A necessary and sufficient condition for the claim of the lemma is that there 
exists at least one 0 ' 1t   such that both of the following inequalities hold: 
( ', ) (0, ) 0i j i jU t U   , (A.1) 
( ', ) (1, ) 0i j i jU t U   . (A.2) 
Let us consider the first inequality, which ensures that 0it   is a suboptimal transfer. 
Simplifying the expected utility function using integration by parts we get 
 
1
0
1
0
( , ) (1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
(1 ) ( | ) ( | ) 1 .
i
i
i
i
t
i i j i i i i ij i i ij
t
t
i i i ij j i ij j i i
t
U t m t t x h x dx x t h x dx
m t H x dx H x dx t
  
    
     
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 
 
 (A.3) 
Substituting this expression for the utility functions in (A.1) results in 
'
0
( ) ( | ) ' (1) (1 ')
t
i i ij j i i iH x dx t m m t        . (A.4) 
Let us define  
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1
1 '
( ) ,
2
i i
i i
t
m x dx
 


 
  
 
  (A.5) 
which denotes the accumulated difference between the value of the marginal 
monetary utility and its lower bound (according to Assumption A2). Then,  
(1) (1 ') '
2
i i
i i im m t t
 


    . (A.6) 
Substituting (A.6) into (A.4) we obtain 
'
0
1
( ) ( | ) .
2
t
i i ij j iH x dx   
 
   
 
  (A.7) 
Let us consider the LHS of the inequality. Note that since j  is the median of the 
recipient’s FOB distribution, it is the median of the conditional SOB distribution as 
well: 
1 1
( | ) [ ( ) | ] [ ] .
2 2
ij j j i j j j iH E H E       (A.8) 
Consequently, it holds for any 't : 
'
0
0
1
lim ( | ) 0,
2j
t
ij jH x dx 
 
  
 
  (A.9) 
'
1
0
1
lim ( | ) 0.
2j
t
ij jH x dx 
 
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 
  (A.10) 
These inequalities ensure that for any i , i  and 't  there exists j  such that the LHS 
of (A.7) is strictly positive. Consequently, for any i , i  and 't , if i  is sufficiently 
small, then (A.7) is satisfied at least for some j .  
Let us consider the second inequality (A.2), which ensures that 1it   is a suboptimal 
transfer. Substituting (A.3) into (A.2) we get 
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Denote  
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so that 
(1 ') (1 ').
2
i i
i im t t
 


     (A.13) 
Substituting (A.13) into (A.11) we obtain 
1
'
( ) ( ( | ) 1/ 2) .i i ij j i
t
H x dx       (A.14) 
Since the LHS of (A.14) is bounded for given i , i  and 't , there always exists a 
function ( )im   with sufficiently large i  so that (A.14) is satisfied for any j . Thus, 
if for given i , i  and 't  a function ( )im   is characterized by a sufficiently small 
positive i  (so that (A.7) is satisfied for some j ) and a sufficiently large i  (so that 
(A.14) is satisfied for the same j ), then there exists an interior solution for these j . 
Since Assumption A2 and concavity of ( )im   allow for both infinitely small i  and 
(simultaneously) infinitely large i  for given i , i  and 't , the claim holds. ∎ 
Lemma 3. ( , )i i jU t   has the strict single crossing property
40 in ( , )i jt   ( ( , )i jt  ) if 
i i   ( i i  ). 
Proof. We have 
                                                          
40 Function ( , )f x z  has the strict single crossing property in ( , )x z  if for any x x   and z z   it 
holds that ( , ) ( , ) 0f x z f x z      implies ( , ) ( , ) 0f x z f x z      (Milgrom and Shannon (1994)). 
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 (A.15) 
Taking the partial derivative of this expression with respect to j  we get
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This, together with Assumption A3, implies that  
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for any (0,1),it   which leads to the claim. ∎ 
Proof of Proposition 1. Let us consider arbitrary values j  and j   such that .j j    
By Lemma 3 and Milgrom-Shannon (1994) Monotone Selection Theorem we have 
that for any arg max ( , )
ii t i i j
t U t    and arg max ( , )
ii t i i j
t U t    it holds i it t   ( )i it t   
if i i   ( ).i i   That is, since 
*( )it   is a best response function such that 
*( ) argmax ( , ),
ii j t i i j
t U t   it is weakly increasing (decreasing) in j  if i i   
( )i i  . If, in addition, 0 1it   (the consistency of this condition with our 
assumptions is established by Lemma 2), then the FOC for maximizing ( , )i i jU t   
must be satisfied at ( , )i it   : 
( , ) 0.i i i
i
U
t
t


  

 (A.18) 
Equation (A.18), together with (A.17), implies that if i i  , then 
                                                          
41 The existence of the derivative on the right hand side of (A.16) is ensured by Assumption A4. 
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( , ) 0.i i j
i
U
t
t


  

 (A.19) 
It follows that arg max ( , )
ii t i i j
t U t   , hence i it t   (if i i  ).
42 This, together with 
the previously established fact that i it t   ( i it t  ) if i i   ( )i i  , yields that 
*( )i jt   is strictly increasing (decreasing) in j  if i i   ( )i i   and 
*0 ( ) 1.i jt    
∎  
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APPENDIX B. Omitted proofs: Experiment 2. 
Let us simplify the subsequent notation so that the pdf of belief of order k  is 
denoted as ( )kh   and the cdf as ( )kH  . The expected utility function of the dictator is 
denoted by ( )iU  . For simplicity, we consider the case with two ex ante dictator SOB 
distributions 
0
, ( )ijH    characterized by the cdfs 
0
21( )H   and 
0
22 ( )H   (and pdfs 
0
21( )h   and 
0
22 ( )),h   which have ex ante probabilities 1p  and 2 11p p  , respectively. In this case 
Assumption A8 translates into 
0
22
0
21
( )
0
( )
h x
h x

 
 
 
 (B.1) 
for any [0,1]x , where the order of functions is without loss of generality. As in 
Section 2, we assume that the dictator plays a pure strategy conditional on j . 
                                                          
42 The argument is analogous to the proof of Theorem 1 in Edlin and Shannon (1998). 
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Lemma 4. For any [0,1]it  , the recipient’s posterior probability of belief 
transmission conditional on it  is equal to the ex ante probability of belief 
transmission. 
Proof. We need to show that for any [0,1]it  , ( ) .it   Denoting by NT the event 
of no belief transmission, we have 
1
1
0
2, 0
1,2 3
1 1
(1 ) ( | )
( ) 1 Pr[ | ] 1
( )
(1 ) ( )
(1 ) ( )
1 1 ,
( ) ( )
i
i i
i
i
i
i i
h t NT
t NT t
h t
h t p
h t
h t h t
 







   


    

 (B.2) 
where the second equality is by Bayes rule, the third equality is by Assumption A6 
and the law of total probability, and the fifth equality is by Assumption A5. ∎ 
Proof of Lemma 1. Given (12) and Lemma 4, the recipient’s third-order belief 
conditional on observing transfer it  is 
0
3, 1 2, |
1,2
( | ) ( ) (1 ) ,
ipr i t
H x t H x H p 

 

     (B.3) 
where | itp  is the updated probability that the dictator holds SOB 
0
2,H   conditional on 
no belief transmission and transfer it . Then (since χ does not depend on it  by Lemma 
4), we obtain 
1|3, 0 0
21 22
( | )
(1 )( ( ) ( )) .i
tpr i
i i
pH x t
H x H x
t t


  
 
 (B.4) 
By Bayes rule 
0 0
21 1 21 1
1| 0 0 0 0
21 1 22 1 21 1 22 1
( | ) ( )
,
( | ) ( | )(1 ) ( ) ( )(1 )i
j i i
t
j i j i i i
h t h p h t p
p
h t h p h t h p h t p h t p
 
   
 (B.5) 
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where the last equality is due to Assumption A6. Taking the derivative of 1| itp  with 
respect to it  and substituting it into (B.4) we obtain  
3, 0 0
21 22
0 0
0 021 22
1 1 22 21
0 0 2
21 1 22 1
( | )
(1 )( ( ) ( ))
( ) ( )
(1 ) ( ) ( )
.
( ( ) ( )(1 ))
pr i
i
i i
i i
i i
i i
H x t
H x H x
t
dh t dh t
p p h t h t
dt dt
h t p h t p


  

 
  
 
 
 (B.6) 
Note that by Assumption A7 this derivative always exists. Consider the right-hand 
side of (B.6). We have 0 021 22( ) ( ) 0H x H x   for (0,1)x , since the strict MLRP (B.1) 
implies strict FOSD of 022H  over 
0
21H . Besides, (B.1) yields 
0 0
0 022 21
21 22
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) 0i ii i
i i
dh t dh t
h t h t
dt dt
   for any [0,1]it  . Consequently, 
3, ( | )
0
pr i
i
H x t
t



 (B.7) 
for any (0,1)x  and [0,1]it  , which implies the statement of the lemma. ∎ 
Lemma 5. 
, ,( , ) ( , )
I I
i pr i j i pub i j
i i
S t S t
t t
  

 
 if i jt   and i i  , or if i jt   and 
,i i   with a strict inequality if, in addition, 0 1it  . 
Proof. To avoid notational confusion, let us prove the claim of the proposition for a 
given value of transfer it t . 
Let us first consider the intentional surprise in the PUBLIC treatment , ( , ).
I
i pub jS t   
Given (7) we have 
 
1
, 3, 3,
0
1
3, 3,
0
( , ) ( ) ( , ) ( ) ( , )
( , ) ( , ) 1 ,
t
I
i pub j i pub j i pub j
t
t
i pub j i pub j i
t
S t t x h x dx x t h x dx
H x dx H x dx t
    
    
   
   
 
 
 (B.8) 
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where the last line is obtained by integration by parts as in (A.3). Taking the 
derivative we get 
,
3,
( , )
( ) ( , ) .
I
i pub j
i i pub j i
S t
H t
t

   

  

 (B.9) 
We have 
0
3, 1 1 3
3, 3,
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) (1 ) ( , )
( , ) ( | ),
pub j j j j
pr j pr i j
H x H x H x H x
H x H x t
     
 
   
  
 (B.10) 
where the first equality is by (10), the second by Assumption A5, and the fourth by 
Assumption A9. 
This, together with (B.9), yields 
,
3,
( , )
( ) ( | ) .
I
i pub j
i i pr i j i
S t
H t t
t

   

   

 (B.11) 
At the same time, applying integration by parts, we have the following expression 
for the intentional surprise in the PRIVATE treatment , ( , )
I
i pr jS t   (generally given by 
(7)): 
 
1
, 3, 3,
0
1
3, 3,
0
( , ) ( ) ( | ) ( ) ( | )
( | ) ( | ) 1 .
t
I
i pr j i pr i pr
t
t
i pr i pr i
t
S t t x h x t dx x t h x t dx
H x t dx H x t dx t
  
  
   
   
 
 
 (B.12) 
Taking the derivative yields 
,
3,
13, 3,
0
( , )
( ) ( | )
( | ) ( | )
.
I
i pr j
i i pr i
t pr pr
i i
t
S t
H t t
t
H x t H x t
dx dx
t t

  
 

  

 
 
  
 (B.13) 
Subtracting (B.11) from (B.13) we arrive at 
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, ,
1 2
( , ) ( , )
,
I I
i pr j i pub jS t S t
D D
t t
  
  
 
 (B.14) 
where 
1 3, 3,( )( ( | ) ( | )),i i pr pr jD H t t H t      
(B.15) 
13, 3,
2
0
( | ) ( | )
.
t pr pr
i i
t
H x t H x t
D dx dx
t t
 
 
 
  
 (B.16) 
We have 1 0D   by Lemma 1 and initial conditions. At the same time, (B.7) implies 
that 2 0D  , with a strict inequality if 0 1t   (given Assumption A1). 
Consequently, the LHS of (B.14) is weakly negative, being strictly negative if 
0 1.t   ∎ 
Corollary 1. 
, ,( , ) ( , )i pr i j i pub i j
i i
U t U t
t t
  

 
 if i jt   and i i  , or if i jt   and 
i i  , with a strict inequality if, in addition, 0 1it  . 
Proof. Given (9) we have 
, , 2 , ,( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) .
I I
i pr i j i pub i j i i pr i j i pub i jU t U t E S t S t          (B.17) 
This together with Lemma 5 leads to the claim. ∎ 
Corollary 2. For any t  and ''t  so that jt t     and i i  , or j t t     and 
i i  , it holds: 
, , , ,( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ).i pub j i pub j i pr j i pr jU t U t U t U t          
Proof. The claim follows from the fact that 
( , )
( , ) ( , )
t i j
i j i j
t
U x
U t U t dx
x

 



  

 
and Corollary 1. ∎ 
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Lemma 6. , ,( , ) ( , )i pr i j i pub i jU t U t   if 0 i jt   , and , ,( , ) ( , )i pr i j i pub i jU t U t   if 
i jt  .  
Proof. To avoid notational confusion, let us prove the claim of the lemma for a given 
value of transfer it t . It follows from (B.8) and (B.10) that 
 
1
, 3, 3,
0
( , ) ( | ) ( | ) 1
t
I
i pub j i pr i j i pr i j i
t
S t H x t dx H x t dx t            . (B.18) 
Subtracting (B.18) from (B.12) yields 
   
, ,
1
3, 3, 3, 3,
0
( , ) ( , )
( | ) ( | ) ( | ) ( | ) .
I I
i pr j i pub j
t
i pr pr j i pr pr j
t
S t S t
H x t H x dx H x t H x dx
 
   

    
 (B.19) 
It follows from (B.19), Lemma 1 and Assumption A1 that , ,( , ) ( , ) 0
I I
i pr j i pub jS t S t    
if 0 jt   , and , ,( , ) ( , ) 0
I I
i pr j i pub jS t S t    if jt  . This, together with (B.17), 
leads to the claim. ∎ 
Lemma 7. If 
*
,0 ( )i pub j jt     and i i  , or if 
*
, ( ) 1j i pub jt    and i i  , then 
* *
, ,( ) ( )i pr j i pub jt t  . 
Proof. For notational simplicity, let us suppress argument j  in the functions of 
optimal transfers 
*
, ( )i pr jt   and 
*
, ( )i pub jt  . Let us first show the weak inequality 
* *
, ,i pr i pubt t  under the assumed conditions. Suppose to the contrary that 
* *
, , .i pub i prt t  
Then, given the initial conditions there can exist only the following cases: 
Case 1: 
* *
, ,0 i pub i pr jt t     and i i  , or 
* *
, ,j i pub i prt t    and i i  .  
Case 2: 
* *
, ,0 i pub j i prt t    and i i  . 
Let us prove that both cases are contradictory. 
Case 1:  
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By Corollary 2 it then follows  
* * * *
, , , , , . , .( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ).i pub i pr j i pub i pub j i pr i pr j i pr i pub jU t U t U t U t       (B.20) 
At the same time, given that 
*
,i prt  and 
*
,i pubt  are the optimal choices in the respective 
treatments, we have 
* *
, , , ,( , ) ( , ) 0,i pr i pr j i pr i pub jU t U t    (B.21) 
* *
, , , ,( , ) ( , ) 0.i pub i pr j i pub i pub jU t U t    (B.22) 
This contradicts (B.20). 
Case 2: 
In this case, by Lemma 6 
* *
, , , ,( , ) ( , ),i pr i pub j i pub i pub jU t U t   (B.23) 
* *
, , , ,( , ) ( , ).i pr i pr j i pub i pr jU t U t   (B.24) 
At the same time, since 
*
,i pubt  is the optimal transfer in the PUBLIC treatment, it holds 
* *
, , , ,( , ) ( , ).i pub i pr j i pub i pub jU t U t   (B.25) 
It follows from (B.23), (B.24) and (B.25) that 
* *
, , , ,( , ) ( , ),i pr i pr j i pr i pub jU t U t   (B.26) 
contradicting to 
*
,i prt  being the optimal transfer in the PRIVATE treatment.  
Thus, we have come to contradiction in all possible cases when 
* *
, ,i pub i prt t , hence 
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* *
, , .i pr i pubt t  (B.27) 
Moreover, this inequality is strict since 
*
,0 1i pubt   by assumption. Indeed, in this 
case FOC for 
*
,i pubt  is satisfied, i.e.,  
, *
,( , ) 0.
i pub
i pub j
i
U
t
t




 (B.28) 
By Corollary 1 it then follows 
, *
,( , ) 0.
i pr
i pub j
i
U
t
t




 (B.29) 
This means that , ( , )i pr i jU t   is strictly decreasing at 
*
,i i pubt t , implying together with 
(B.27) that 
* *
, ,i pr i pubt t . ∎ 
Proof of Proposition 2. Given that 
*
,0 ( ) 1i pub jt    (the existence of interior 
solutions in the PUBLIC treatment is ensured by Lemma 2), the following first-order 
condition for maximizing expected utility in the PUBLIC treatment must be satisfied 
(suppressing the argument in 
*( )i jt   for notational simplicity): 
*
,
*
,
1, * *
, , 2 2
0
* *
2 , ,
( , ) (1 ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) (1 ) 0,
i pub
i pub
ti pub
i pub j i i pub i j i j
t
i
i i i pub j i i i pub
U
t m t h x dx h x dx
t
H t m t
    
   

      

      
 
 (B.30) 
where the first equality is by (11) and (8). It follows from the last equality and 
Assumption A2 that 
*
2 ,
1
( ) ( ) 0.
2
i i i pub jH t  
 
    
 
 (B.31) 
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Consequently, given that j  is the median of 2 ( | )jH   by (A.8), if 
*
,i pub jt  , then 
i i  , and if 
*
,i pub jt  , then i i  . In these cases, 
* *
, ,i pr i pubt t  by Lemma 7. At the 
same time, if 
*
,i pub jt  , then the necessary condition for Lemma 7 is satisfied for any 
i  and i . Consequently, 
* *
, ,i pr i pubt t  as well.  ∎ 
APPENDIX C. Robustness of Proposition 2 to false consensus 
One can show that the analytical results obtained in Section 3.1 are robust to the 
presence of false consensus, for which we found evidence in Experiment 1. In 
particular, we show below that if dictators care about the recipients’ beliefs and, at the 
same time, do have a false consensus bias in their SOBs formation, then the same 
prediction for the difference in transfers between the treatments is obtained as under 
the consistent formation of beliefs (i.e., as under Assumptions A5 and A6, which we 
lift here). 
The false consensus typically implies that own behavior is considered as 
representative for the whole population (Ross et al. (1977)). In terms of our model, 
this means that one’s own transfer serves as a signal about others’ transfers and, more 
importantly, about others’ representative expectations. This can be expressed in the 
form of the assumption that, if no information about the recipient’s belief is available, 
the dictator’s SOB is formed in the same way as if he got a direct signal j  equal to 
his optimal transfer *it :  
* *( | ) ( | ),ij i ij j iH x t H x t   (C.1) 
where 
*( | )ij iH t  is the cdf of the SOB under false consensus. Besides, we assume that 
the recipient is aware of this fact, i.e., in the PRIVATE treatment her third-order 
belief is (setting for simplicity 0  ) 
*
, ( | ) [ ( | )] [ ( | )].jij pr i j ij i i j ij j iH x t E H x t t E H x t     (C.2) 
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This can be justified by the false consensus arising not from some irrational 
unconscious bias, but rather from a lack of dictator’s information, whereby each 
dictator treats his transfer as the only signal to predict the behavior of others. Such 
kind of ‘rational’ false consensus was introduced by Dawes (1989).  
Assumption A3 and (C.2) jointly imply that , ( | )jij pr iH x t  exhibits a strict FOSD in 
it :  
, ( | )
0
jij pr i
i
H x t
t



 (C.3) 
for any (0,1)x  and [0,1]it  . Hence, we get the same result as in Lemma 1 for the 
previous case of rational beliefs. The main difference is that before the positive 
correlation between transfers and beliefs was driven by the internal consistency of ex 
ante beliefs assumed by recipients (Assumption A6), while in the false consensus 
case beliefs are shaped by transfers directly. 
The FOSD property of the third-order belief allows for the same line of reasoning 
by comparing the treatments as in the rational case. In the PRIVATE treatment the 
recipient updates her third-order belief so that it follows the observed transfer, since 
she believes that the dictator is uninformed and, thus, his SOB is subject to the false 
consensus effect. In contrast, the (presumed) false consensus effect does not affect 
beliefs in the PUBLIC treatment, since there we have common knowledge about the 
actual dictator’s SOB (formed by signal j ). This leads to a smaller scope of 
attribution of intentions in the PRIVATE treatment, decreasing the dictator’s 
corresponding motivations and yielding a smaller transfer relatively to the level in the 
PUBLIC treatment. The formal proofs in this case follow the similar lines as in 
Appendix B.43  
We conclude that our analytical predictions from Section 3.1 and our hypothesis 
from Section 3.2 are robust to the presence of false consensus.  
  
                                                          
43 In particular, the result of Lemma 1 is implied by (C.3). The subsequent proof follows the same line 
of arguments as the proofs in Appendix B starting with Lemma 5 (with the only exception that the 
result of (B.10) is directly implied by (C.2)). 
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APPENDIX D. Sequence of actions in Part 2 of Experiment 4 
  Recipient 
Do not transmit FOB Transmit FOB 
Dictator sends an unconditional 
transfer 
Nature 
• Dictator sends an unconditional 
transfer;  
• Recipient is not informed about 
the (non)transmission 
Nature 
Do not transmit FOB Transmit FOB 
PRIVATE PUBLIC 
• Dictator decides on a transfer, 
conditional on being in the 
PRIVATE or PUBLIC 
treatment;  
• Recipient is not informed about 
the transmission 
• Dictator decides on a transfer, 
conditional on being in the 
PRIVATE or PUBLIC 
treatment;  
• Recipient is informed about 
the transmission 
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APPENDIX E. Experimental instructions 
E.1 Experiment 1 
Below you find instructions for Experiment 1 translated from German. 
 
Dictators’ instructions 
 
General information 
Welcome to our experiment. In this experiment you can earn money. You will receive 
your payoff against the attached receipt, which we ask you to keep.  
You are not allowed to speak with other participants during the session. If you have 
any questions please raise your hand, the experimenter will come to help you. If you 
violate these rules, we will have to exclude you from the experiment and all 
payments. 
 
Decision situation 
In this experiment all participants are randomly divided into Participants A and 
Participants B, and each participant is randomly matched with another person. You 
are Participant A, the other person is Participant B. 
Each pair receives an endowment of 14 Euro. Then you have to decide about how this 
sum should be divided between you and Participant B. This means, you determine 
your own amount and the amount of Participant B so that 
 
Your payoff=14 Euro – amount of Participant B 
Payoff of Participant B= amount of Participant B 
 
Prior to your decision your matched Participant B will be asked to guess how much of 
the 14 Euro, on average, Participant A will send to Participant B. You will be 
informed about the guess of your matched Participant B first after your decision about 
the division of the sum is made. However, you can set the amount of Participant B to 
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depend on the possible guesses of Participant B. The payoff-relevant amount of 
Participant B is then the amount that you chose for the actual guess of Participant B. 
Participant B does not know that you will be informed about his guess and that you 
can condition your decision on it. 
 
Participant B can get an additional payoff by his guess. The Participant B, whose 
guess is the closest to the actual average amount received by Participants B, wins an 
additional bonus of 8.00 Euro. If several participants are closest, then the person who 
gets the bonus is determined randomly. 
Take your time and make sure you understand these instructions. 
All decisions and payoffs are confidential. No other participant will get to know your 
payoffs.  
Moreover, no participant will get to know during or after the experiment which other 
participant he or she was assigned to.   
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Form for Participant A 
Please indicate your decision. 
If the (rounded) guess of my Participant 
B about his amount is the following (see 
inputs in this column)… 
… then I give him the following 
amount: 
0,00 € _ _ , _ _  € 
0,50 € _ _ , _ _  € 
1,00 € _ _ , _ _  € 
1,50 € _ _ , _ _  € 
2,00 € _ _ , _ _  € 
2,50 € _ _ , _ _  € 
3,00 € _ _ , _ _  € 
3,50 € _ _ , _ _  € 
4,00 € _ _ , _ _  € 
4,50 € _ _ , _ _  € 
5,00 € _ _ , _ _  € 
5,50 € _ _ , _ _  € 
6,00 € _ _ , _ _  € 
6,50 € _ _ , _ _  € 
7,00 € _ _ , _ _  € 
7,50 € _ _ , _ _  € 
8,00 € _ _ , _ _  € 
8,50 € _ _ , _ _  € 
9,00 € and more _ _ , _ _  € 
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Post-experimental questionnaire 
Finally, we would like to ask you a few questions. 
Age:     ____ years 
Gender:       (female/male) 
Field of study:  ______ 
Semester:    ______ 
Mother tongue:  ______ 
Do you know the decision situation from a previous experiment? (Yes/No) 
What do you think is the amount that Participant A should send to Participant B? 
[0.00-14.00 Euro]   _ _ , _ _  Euro. 
What do you think is the average amount that Participant A sends to Participant B? 
[0.00-14.00 Euro]   _ _ , _ _  Euro. 
What do you think is the average guess of all Participants B about the amount sent by 
Participant A to Participant B? [0.00-14.00 Euro]   _ _ , _ _  Euro. 
 
Recipients’ instructions 
 
General information 
Welcome to our experiment. In this experiment you can earn money. You will receive 
your payoff against the attached receipt, which we ask you to keep.  
You are not allowed to speak with other participants during the session. If you have 
any questions please raise your hand, the experimenter will come to help you. If you 
violate these rules, we will have to exclude you from the experiment and all 
payments. 
 
Decision situation 
In this experiment all participants are randomly divided into Participants A and 
Participants B, and each participant is randomly matched with another person. You 
are Participant B, the other person is Participant A. 
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Each pair receives an endowment of 14 Euro. Then Participant A has to decide about 
how this sum should be divided between himself and Participant B. This means, he 
determines his own amount and your amount so that 
 
Payoff of Participant A=14 Euro – your amount 
Your payoff = your amount 
 
Before Participant A makes the decision, you will be asked to guess how much of the 
14 Euro, on average, Participant A will send to Participant B.  
You can get an additional payoff by your guess. The Participant B, whose guess is the 
closest to the actual average amount received by Participants B, wins an additional 
bonus of 8.00 Euro. If several participants are closest, then the person who gets the 
bonus is determined randomly. 
Take your time and make sure you understand these instructions. 
All decisions and payoffs are confidential. No other participant will get to know your 
payoffs.  
Moreover, no participant will get to know during or after the experiment which other 
participant he or she was assigned to.  
 
Form for Participant B  
What do you believe is the average amount that Participants B will get?  
Please state a value from [0.00 - 14.00 Euro]: 
 
___ ___ , ___ ___  Euro.  
 
 
Post-experimental questionnaire 
Finally, we would like to ask you a few questions. 
Age:     ____ years 
Gender:       (female/male) 
Field of study:  ______ 
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Semester:    ______ 
Mother tongue:  ______ 
Do you know the decision situation from a previous experiment? (Yes/No) 
What do you think is the amount that Participant A should send to Participant B? 
[0.00-14.00 Euro]   _ _ , _ _  Euro. 
What is the amount that you would have sent in the role of Participant A? [0.00-14.00 
Euro]   _ _ , _ _  Euro. 
What do you think? What does your matched Participant A think is the amount that 
Participants B expect on average? [0.00-14.00 Euro]   _ _ , _ _  Euro. 
 
E.2 Experiment 2  
Below you find instructions for Experiment 2 translated from German. The 
instructions for treatments PUBLIC and PRIVATE differ only in the sentences 
marked in the text. 
 
Dictators’ instructions 
 
General information 
Welcome to the experiment! In this experiment you can earn money. How much you 
can earn depends on your decisions. You will receive an amount of 2.50 Euro for 
your participation that will be paid out irrespective of the decisions in the experiment. 
From now on please do not communicate with other participants. If you have a 
question, please raise your hand! We will come to your desk and answer your 
question. If you violate these rules, we will have to exclude you from the experiment 
and all payments. 
 
Decision situation 
In this experiment, two participants are randomly matched. One participant is 
randomly assigned the role of Participant A, the other is randomly assigned the role 
of Participant B.  
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You are Participant A, the other person is Participant B. 
You receive an endowment of 10 Euro. From this endowment, you can send any 
amount to Participant B. Payoffs are calculated as follows: 
Your payoff  = 10 Euro – amount sent  
Payoff of B  = Amount sent  
Prior to your decision, Participant B will be asked to guess how much of the 10 Euro, 
on average, Participant A will send to Participant B. You will be informed about 
Participant B’s guess before you decide on the amount to be sent. 
[Treatment PUBLIC] After Participant B made the guess he/she will be informed 
that you know his/her guess before you choose the amount to be sent. 
[Treatment PRIVATE] Participant B will not be informed that you know his/her 
guess.  
Participant B can achieve an additional payoff through his/her guess. The Participant 
B whose guess is closest to the actual average will win an amount of 8 Euro. 
Take your time and make sure that you understand these instructions. All decisions 
and payoffs are confidential. No participant will get to know your payoffs, and you 
will receive the money in a closed envelope when you leave the laboratory. 
Moreover, no participant will get to know during or after the experiment which other 
participant he or she was assigned to. 
 
Post-experimental questionnaire 
Finally, we would like to ask you a few questions. 
Age:     ____ years 
Gender:       (female/male) 
Faculty:    (business/economics, law, medicine, arts and humanities, 
mathematics and natural sciences, human sciences, no student) 
Semester:    ______ 
Mother tongue:  ______ 
Do you know the decision situation from a previous experiment? (Yes/No) 
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What do you think is the amount that Participant A should send to Participant B? 
[0.00-10.00 Euro]   _ _ , _ _  Euro. 
What do you think is the average amount that Participant A sends to Participant B? 
[0.00-10.00 Euro]   _ _ , _ _  Euro. 
What do you think is the average guess of all Participants B about the amount sent by 
Participant A? [0.00-10.00 Euro]   _ _ , _ _  Euro. 
 
Recipients’ instructions 
 
Instructions for Participant B were identical in the PUBLIC and the PRIVATE 
treatments. In the PUBLIC treatment, Participants B additionally received the 
following information displayed on the computer screens after they had typed in their 
guesses: “Participant A will be informed about your guess of ____Euro before he 
decides on the amount sent to you.”  
 
General information 
Welcome to the experiment! In this experiment you can earn money. How much you 
can earn depends on your decisions. You will receive an amount of 2.50 Euro for 
your participation that will be paid out irrespective of the decisions in the experiment. 
From now on please do not communicate with other participants. If you have a 
question, please raise your hand! We will come to your desk and answer your 
question. If you violate these rules, we will have to exclude you from the experiment 
and all payments. 
 
Decision situation 
In this experiment, two participants are randomly matched. One participant is 
randomly assigned the role of Participant A, the other is randomly assigned the role 
of Participant B.  
You are Participant B, the other person is Participant A. 
Participant A receives an endowment of 10 Euro. From this endowment, he or she can 
send any amount to you. Payoffs are calculated as follows: 
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Payoff of A  = 10 Euro – amount sent  
Your Payoff  = Amount sent  
Prior to Participant A’s decision, you will be asked to guess how much of the 10 
Euro, on average, Participant A will send to Participant B.  
You can achieve an additional payoff through your guess. The Participant B whose 
guess is closest to the actual average will win an amount of 8 Euro. 
Take your time and make sure that you understand these instructions. All decisions 
and payoffs are confidential. No participant will get to know your payoffs, and you 
will receive the money in a closed envelope when you leave the laboratory. 
Moreover, no participant will get to know during or after the experiment which other 
participant he or she was assigned to.  
 
Post-experimental questionnaire 
Finally, we would like to ask you a few questions. 
Age:     ____ years 
Gender:       (female/male) 
Faculty:    (business/economics, law, medicine, arts and humanities, 
mathematics and natural sciences, human sciences, no student) 
Semester:    ______ 
Mother tongue:  ______ 
Do you know the decision situation from a previous experiment? (Yes/No) 
What do you think is the amount that Participant A should send to Participant B? 
[0.00-10.00 Euro]   _ _ , _ _  Euro. 
What is the amount that you would have sent in the role of Participant A? [0.00-10.00 
Euro]   _ _ , _ _  Euro. 
What do you think? What does your matched Participant A think is the amount that 
Participants B expect on average? [0.00-10.00 Euro]   _ _ , _ _  Euro.  
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E.3 Experiment 3  
Below you find instructions for Experiment 3 translated from German. Dictators and 
recipients obtained the same instructions. 
 
General Information 
Welcome to the experiment! In this experiment you can earn money. How much you 
earn depends on your decisions and the decisions of other participants. 
Your payoff and your decisions are confidential. No participant will know, during or 
after the experiment, whom he has interacted with and how much other participants 
earned. Your decisions are thus anonymous.  
The experiment consists of two parts. First, you receive the instructions for the first 
part of the experiment. After the first part is finished, you receive the instructions for 
the second part of the experiment.  
After the experiment is finished, one of the two parts of the experiment will be 
randomly chosen for all participants. The payoffs resulting from the decisions of the 
participants in this randomly chosen experimental part will then be paid out. 
From now on please do not communicate with other participants. If you have a 
question concerning the experiment please raise your hand! We then come to you and 
answer your question. If you violate these rules, we will have to exclude you from the 
experiment and all payments. 
Instructions for the first part 
In this experiment all participants are randomly divided into Participants A and 
Participants B, and each participant is randomly matched with another person so that 
each Participant A is matched with a Participant B.  
All participants get an amount of 2.50 Euro, which is paid to them independently of 
their decisions in the first part of the experiment.  
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Participant A receives an endowment of 14 Euro from us. He can then send any 
amount from this endowment to Participant B. The payoffs are as follows: 
Payoff of Participant A = 14 Euro – amount sent 
Payoff of Participant B = amount sent 
Participant B will be informed about the amount, which was sent to him by 
Participant A, only at the end of the experiment, i.e., after its second part.  
Before Participant A takes the decision about the amount to send, Participant B is 
asked to guess the amount that Participants A are going to send on average to 
Participants B. Also Participant A, prior to his decision about the amount to send, is 
asked about what he thinks is the average guess submitted by Participants B.  
Participants A as well as Participants B can earn additional payoffs through their 
guesses, because the best guess among Participants A as well as among Participants B 
will be rewarded with 8 Euro. This reward will be paid at the end of the experiment in 
any case, independently of which experimental part is randomly chosen. 
This is the end of the instructions for the first experimental part. Take your time and 
make sure that you understand these instructions. If you still have questions, please 
raise your hand and one of the experimenters will come to you. 
Instructions for the second part 
In the second part of the experiment all participants keep the roles (Participant A and 
Participant B), which were assigned to them before the first part. 
Each Participant A is matched with a new Participant B. It is ensured that no 
Participant A is matched with the same Participant B, with whom he has been already 
matched in the first part. 
Participant A receives an amount of 2.50 Euro, which is paid to him independently of 
the decisions in the second part of the experiment. 
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Participant B can decide in the beginning of the second part whether his guess from 
the first part (his guess about the average amount sent to Participants B by 
Participants A) may be transmitted to his currently matched Participant A. 
If Participant B decides that her guess may be transmitted, she gets an amount of 2.50 
Euro, which is paid to her independently of the decisions in the second part of the 
experiment. 
If Participant B decides against the transmission of his guess, he then does not get the 
amount of 2.50 Euro. 
As in the first part of the experiment, Participant A receives from us an endowment of 
14 Euro. He can then send any amount from this endowment to Participant B. The 
decision of Participant A about the amount to be sent to Participant B proceeds as 
follows:  
First, Participant A is informed whether his matched Participant B has allowed to 
transmit his guess to him. There are two possible cases: 
1) If Participant B has not allowed to transmit his guess, then Participant A 
submits only one amount to send. The payoffs then are as follows: 
Payoff of Participant A = 14 Euro – amount sent 
Payoff of Participant B = amount sent 
2) If Participant B has allowed to transmit his guess, then Participant A has to 
submit “conditional” amounts to send. 
“Conditional” amounts to send are amounts which are set depending on 
possible guesses of Participant B. This means that Participant A submits an 
amount to send for each possible (rounded) guess of Participant B (see the 
table below).  
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If the (rounded) guess of my Participant 
B about the average amount sent is the 
following (see inputs in this column)… 
… then I send my Participant B the 
following amount: 
0,00 € _ _ , _ _  € 
0,50 € _ _ , _ _  € 
1,00 € _ _ , _ _  € 
1,50 € _ _ , _ _  € 
2,00 € _ _ , _ _  € 
2,50 € _ _ , _ _  € 
3,00 € _ _ , _ _  € 
3,50 € _ _ , _ _  € 
4,00 € _ _ , _ _  € 
4,50 € _ _ , _ _  € 
5,00 € _ _ , _ _  € 
5,50 € _ _ , _ _  € 
6,00 € _ _ , _ _  € 
6,50 € _ _ , _ _  € 
7,00 € _ _ , _ _  € 
7,50 € _ _ , _ _  € 
8,00 € _ _ , _ _  € 
8,50 € _ _ , _ _  € 
9,00 € and more _ _ , _ _  € 
 
At this point, Participant A does not yet know the actual guess of Participant 
B. He is informed about the guess after he has decided about all “conditional” 
amounts. The amount, which is then relevant for payment, is the amount that 
Participant A has chosen for the true guess of Participant B. Then, the payoffs 
are as follows: 
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Payoff of Participant A = 14 Euro – amount sent for the true guess of 
Participant B 
Payoff of Participant B = amount sent for the true guess of Participant B 
This is the end of the instructions for the second experimental part. Take your time 
and make sure that you understand these instructions. If you still have questions, 
please raise your hand and one of the experimenters will come to you.  
 
Post-experimental questionnaire 
Final questionnaire: Please answer the following questions: 
Have you been Participant A or Participant B during the experiment? 
Age:     ____ years 
Gender:       (female/male) 
In which faculty do you study:    (business/economics, law, medicine, arts and 
humanities, mathematics and natural sciences, human sciences, no student) 
Semester:    ______ 
Mother tongue:  ______ 
In how many experiments have you participated before (approximately)? 
Do you know the decision situation from a previous experiment? (Yes/No)  
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E.4 Experiment 4  
Below you find instructions for Experiment 4 translated from German. Dictators and 
recipients obtained the same instructions. 
 
General Information 
Welcome to the experiment! In this experiment you can earn money. How much you 
earn depends on your decisions and the decisions of other participants. 
Your payoff and your decisions are confidential. No participant will know, during or 
after the experiment, whom he has interacted with and how much other participants 
earned. Your decisions are thus anonymous.  
The experiment consists of two parts. First, you receive the instructions for the first 
part of the experiment. After the first part is finished, you receive the instructions for 
the second part of the experiment. All participants in this experiment receive identical 
instructions. 
After the experiment is finished, one of the two parts of the experiment will be 
randomly chosen for all participants. The payoffs resulting from the decisions of the 
participants in this randomly chosen experimental part will then be paid out to the 
participants. 
From now on please do not communicate with other participants. If you have a 
question concerning the experiment please raise your hand! We then come to you and 
answer your question. If you violate these rules, we will have to exclude you from the 
experiment and all payments. 
Instructions for the first part 
In this experiment all participants are randomly divided into Participants A and 
Participants B, and each participant is randomly matched with another person so that 
each Participant A is matched with a Participant B.  
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All participants get an amount of 2.50 Euro, which is paid to them independently of 
their decisions in the first part of the experiment.  
Participant A receives an endowment of 14 Euro from us. He can then send any 
amount from this endowment to Participant B. The payoffs are as follows: 
Payoff of Participant A = 14 Euro – amount sent 
Payoff of Participant B = amount sent 
Participant B will be informed about the amount, which was sent to him by 
Participant A, only at the end of the experiment, i.e., after its second part.  
Before Participant A makes the decision about the amount to send, Participant B is 
asked to guess the amount that Participants A are going to send on average to 
Participants B. Also Participant A, prior to his decision about the amount to send, is 
asked about what he thinks is the average guess submitted by Participants B.  
Participants A as well as Participants B can earn additional payoffs through their 
guesses, because the best guess among Participants A as well as among Participants B 
will be rewarded with 8 Euro. This reward will be paid at the end of the experiment in 
any case, independently of which experimental part is randomly chosen. 
This is the end of the instructions for the first experimental part. Take your time and 
make sure that you understand these instructions. If you still have questions, please 
raise your hand and one of the experimenters will come to you. 
Instructions for the second part 
In the second part of the experiment all participants keep the roles (Participant A and 
Participant B), which were assigned to them before the first part. 
The second part of the experiment consists of 2 rounds. At the beginning of each 
round in this part, each Participant A is matched with a new Participant B. It is 
ensured that no Participant A is matched with the same Participant B, with whom he 
has been already matched in the first part or in the previous round. 
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Participant A receives an amount of 2.50 Euro, which is paid to him independently of 
the decisions in the second part of the experiment. 
Each round of the second part consists of two phases: 
Phase 1: Transmission of the guess 
Participant B can decide whether his guess from the first part (his guess about the 
average amount sent to Participants B by Participants A) may be transmitted to the 
Participants A that he will be matched with in the second part. 
If Participant B decides that his guess may be transmitted, she also gets an amount of 
2.50 Euro, which is paid to him independently of the decisions in the second part of 
the experiment. 
If Participant B decides against the transmission of his guess, he then does not get the 
amount of 2.50 Euro. 
Phase 2: Decision about the amount sent and the information of the participants 
In both rounds of the second part of the experiment, Participant A receives from us an 
endowment of 14 Euro. He can then send any amount from this endowment to the 
Participant B he is matched with in the current round. 
If Participant B in Phase 1 has allowed to transmit his guess, it is nevertheless 
uncertain if the Participant A he is matched with in the current round will be 
actually informed about the guess. In this case, it is randomly determined whether 
or not Participant A will be informed about the guess.  
With 50% probability, the guess will be transmitted; in this case Participant A knows 
the guess of the Participant B he is matched with in the current round. 
Otherwise, the guess will not be transmitted; in this case Participant A does not know 
the guess of the Participant B he is matched with in the current round. 
If the guess was transmitted to Participant A, Participant B will be informed with 
50% probability at the end of the experiment if Participant A in fact knew her 
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guess in the particular round. In all other cases, Participant B will not be informed 
about this. 
If Participant B has allowed to transmit his guess and the guess was actually 
transmitted, Participant A submits conditional amounts to send in the current round: 
 The amount (0 to 14 Euro) he wants to send in case Participant B is informed 
at the end of the experiment whether Participant A knew his guess. 
 The amount (0 to 14 Euro) he wants to send in case Participant B is not 
informed at the end of the experiment whether Participant A knew his guess. 
The payoffs are as follows, conditional on the actual information of Participant B: 
Payoff of Participant A = 14 Euro – conditional amount sent 
Payoff of Participant B = conditional amount sent 
If Participant B has not allowed to transmit her guess or he has allowed but the guess 
has not been transmitted, Participant A submits the amount to send (0 to 14 Euro) to 
the Participant B in the current round, without knowing his guess. 
The payoffs are then as follows: 
Payoff of Participant A = 14 Euro – amount sent 
Payoff of Participant B = amount sent 
At the end of the experiment, Participant B will be informed about the amounts sent 
in both rounds. 
If the second part is relevant for the payoffs of the participants, one of the two rounds 
of this part is randomly chosen. The payoffs resulting from the decisions of the 
participants in this round will then be paid out to the participants. 
This is the end of the instructions for the second experimental part. Take your time 
and make sure that you understand these instructions. If you still have questions, 
please raise your hand and one of the experimenters will come to you.  
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Post-experimental questionnaire 
Final questionnaire: Please answer the following questions: 
Have you been Participant A or Participant B during the experiment? 
Age:     ____ years 
Gender:       (female/male) 
In which faculty do you study:    (business/economics, law, medicine, arts and 
humanities, mathematics and natural sciences, human sciences, no student) 
Semester:    ______ 
Mother tongue:  ______ 
In how many experiments have you participated before (approximately)? 
Do you know the decision situation from a previous experiment? (Yes/No)  
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APPENDIX F. Additional results 
Experiment 2 
Table F.1 lists the results of Tobit models with the amount sent by the dictator as 
the dependent variable. In Model 1, we only include a dummy variable for the 
PUBLIC treatment. Its coefficient is positive and highly significant, corroborating our 
treatment effect. In Model 2, we additionally include the expectation of the matched 
recipient which turns out to be insignificant while the PUBLIC dummy is largely 
unaffected. Finally, the strong treatment effect and the lack of an impact of the 
matched recipient’s belief remain unchanged when we additionally include variables 
capturing the demographic backgrounds of the subjects (see Model 3).44  
Table F.1 
Determinants of dictator transfers in Experiment 2. 
No. 1 2 3 
Dependent Variable Transfer Transfer Transfer 
Model Tobit Tobit Tobit 
        
PUBLIC 0.982** 0.998** 1.017** 
  [0.400] [0.399] [0.395] 
Recipient's expectation   0.121 0.138 
    [0.144] [0.141] 
Age     -0.009 
      [0.056] 
Female     -0.113 
      [0.401] 
Business student     -0.152 
      [0.414] 
Dictator game known     -0.799** 
      [0.399] 
Constant 0.353 0.076 -0.047 
  [0.303] [0.452] [1.633] 
        
Observations 127 127 127 
Log-Likelihood -218.4 -218.0 -215.8 
Tobit models are calculated to account for the share of observations with zero transfers. Standard 
errors are given in brackets. ** denotes significance at the 5%-level. ‘Age’ is the participant’s age in 
years. The dummy variable ‘Female’ takes the value of 1 if the participant is female. ‘Business 
student’ is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the participant is enrolled at the faculty of economics and 
business. Finally, ‘Dictator game known’ is a dummy variable indicating whether the subject knew the 
decision situation in advance. 
                                                          
44 The only significant impact of the demographical background is found for subjects who previously 
knew the decision situation of the dictator game – the negative and significant coefficient indicates that 
these subjects decrease their transfers compared to subjects without previous experience. Nobody 
participated twice in our experiments.  
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Experiment 3 
Table F.2 contrasts the results of Experiment 1 with the results from the relevant 
Part 2 of Experiment 3. In Experiment 3, dictators transferred on average 2.24 Euro 
conditioned on the true FOB of their matched recipient. This accounts for 16% of the 
endowment which is less than the 24% from Experiment 1, perhaps due to the fact 
that Experiment 1 was conducted in the classroom while Experiment 3 was ran in the 
laboratory which might create larger social distance between participants.45  
Table F.2  
Comparison of results: Experiment 1 versus Experiment 3 
  Experiment 3 Experiment 1 
Average transfer 
2.24 Euro (16% of 
endowment) 
3.25 Euro (23% of 
endowment) 
Between-subject correlation coefficient of 
transfers with guesses 
0.054, p=0.619 -0.017, p=0.821 
Share of dictators who vary conditional 
transfers 
71.6% 77.5% 
Share of dictators with a statistically 
significant (at the 5% level) within-subject 
correlation 
58.0% 53.9% 
Share of dictators with a significantly 
positive correlation 
43.2% 37.7% 
Share of dictators with a significantly 
negative correlation 
14.8% 16.2% 
Share of transfers strictly above guesses 23.9% 27.2% 
Average size of positive regression 
coefficients 
0.36 0.58 
Average size of negative regression 
coefficients 
0.29 0.53 
Share of non-monotonic subjects with a 
significant within-subject correlation 
15.7% 30.1% 
 
Experiment 4 
Table F.3 lists Tobit models to account for the share of observations with zero 
transfers, while including random effects for the dictators. The dependent variable in 
these models is the amount sent in Part 2 of Experiment 4 for the cases in which the 
                                                          
45 The average amount sent in Part 1 of Experiment 3 accounts for 2.84 Euro or 20.3% of the 
endowment. 
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dictator in fact observed the FOB of his matched recipient.46 The coefficient of the 
dummy variable for the PUBLIC treatment is significant in all specifications, while 
the coefficient of the recipient’s expectation is insignificant in Models 2 and 3. With 
respect to the effect of the demographic variables, and unlike in the model for 
Experiment 2 reported in Table F.1, ‘Age’ has a significant negative coefficient, 
indicating that older dictators transfer less. Contrary to Model 3 in Table F.1, the 
dummy ‘Dictator game known’ has an (insignificant) positive coefficient. All other 
demographic variables are (as before) insignificant. 
Table F.3 
Determinants of dictator transfers in Experiment 4 (Part 2, case of belief transmission). 
No. 1 2 3 
Dependent Variable Transfer Transfer Transfer 
Model Tobit Tobit Tobit 
        
PUBLIC 0.529*** 0.529*** 0.531*** 
  [0.182] [0.182] [0.183] 
Recipient's expectation   0.183 0.268 
    [0.173] [0.168] 
Age     -0.203** 
      [0.089] 
Female     0.608 
      [0.642] 
Business student     0.069 
      [0.652] 
Dictator game known     0.981 
      [0.648] 
Constant 2.257*** 1.625** 5.343** 
  [0.360] [0.702] [2.253] 
        
Observations 126 126 124 
Log-Likelihood -229.0 -228.4 -221.3 
Tobit models with random effects on the level of dictators are calculated to account for the share of 
observations with zero transfers. Standard errors are given in brackets. *** and ** denote significance 
at the 1%- and 5%-level, respectively. ‘Age’ is the participant’s age in years. The dummy variable 
‘Female’ takes the value of 1 if the participant is female. ‘Business student’ is a dummy variable equal 
to 1 if the participant is enrolled at the faculty of economics and business. Finally, ‘Dictator game 
known’ is a dummy variable indicating whether the subject knew the decision situation in advance. 
                                                          
46 The average amount sent in Part 1 of Experiment 4 is 3.03 Euro or 21.6% of the endowment. 
